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For the Sake of the Children:
Court Consideration of Religion in Child
Custody Cases
Jennifer Ann Drobac*
Concerned that many courts routinely examine parents' religious beliefs
and practices in child custody cases-despite First Amendment protections-
Jennifer Drobac reviews pertinent federal constitutional law and recently pub-
lished state custody cases. She finds that nearly sixty percent of the cases em-
ploy standards that violate the Establishment, Free Exercise, Supremacy, and
Equal Protection Clauses. To protect religious freedoms while preserving the
best interests of children, Drobac proposes the application of a procedure she
terms "NOAH, " the New Osier Actual Harm test, under which courts could not
consider religion during the initial custody determination. Only later, in a bi-
furcated proceeding, could the court modify its original determination using the
least restrictive means available, if it first found that a parent's religious beliefs
or practices actually had harmed or would harm a child. Drobac concludes
that NOAH would minimize constitutional violations, prevent religious bias
from corrupting custody determinations, and serve the best interests of children
by ensuring that the most qualified caregiver receives custody, regardless of re-
ligion.
No chapter in human history has been so largely written in terms of perse-
cution and intolerance as the one dealing with religious freedom. From ancient
times to the present day, the ingenuity of man has known no limits in its ability
to forge weapons of oppression for use against those who dare to express or
practice unorthodox religious beliefs.I
* Lecturer at Law, Stanford Law School; J.S.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, 1999. J.D.,
Stanford Law School, 1987; A.M. (English History), Stanford University, 1987; A.B., Stanford Univer-
sity, 1981. I thank Janet E. Halley and Margaret H. Man for their supportive encouragement, guidance,
and suggestions. I also thank Martin Drobac, Kathleen A. Kane and the staff of the Stanford Law Re-
view for their editorial suggestions, and Kathleen M. Sullivan for kindling a passion for First Amend-
ment law. This note is dedicated to my daughter, Michal Jillian McDowell.
1. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 175-76 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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INTRODUCTION
In August 1988, the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas awarded
custody of three-year-old Bobby Pater to his father even though the boy's
mother had been his primary caretaker since his birth.2 The visitation order
declared that his mother "shall not teach or expose the child to the Jeho-
vah[']s Witnesses' beliefs in any form."'3 Four years later, a period repre-
senting more than half of little Bobby Pater's lifetime, the Ohio Supreme
Court reversed this decision in Pater v. Pater.4 The Court held that a parent
cannot be denied custody on the basis of her religious practices unless pro-
bative evidence demonstrates that those practices will adversely impact the
child.5 The Pater case highlights the dilemma courts face in considering
parents' religious beliefs when making child custody determinations: When
do the best interests of the child permit a court to interfere with parents' re-
ligious liberties and their right to provide religious instruction to their chil-
dren?
The First Amendment admonition that "Congress shall make no law re-
specting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise there-
of. .",6 ought to deflect any family law court from venturing into the amor-
phous realm of religious belief without the guidance of well-defined stan-
dards. That is not our contemporary experience, however. Since the adop-
tion of the best interests of the child standard in the 1970s,7 judicial inquiry
into religious beliefs in child custody cases occurs frequently despite consti-
tutional dictates. Illustratively, the Pater court held, "Today we reaffirm that
a domestic relations court may consider the religious practices of the parents
in order to protect the best interests of a child."'8
2. See Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794, 801 (Ohio 1992) (reviewing the facts before the trial
court).
3. Id. (quoting the trial court). The Ohio Supreme Court criticized the restrictions as being
overbroad. It also noted that the Paters "are both loving parents, and no testimony seriously dis-
puted either parent's ability to nurture Bobby." Id. at 799.
4. See id. at 801.
5. See id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958) (freedom of asso-
ciation); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying Free Exercise and Estab-
lishment Clauses to states).
7. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The Zummo court explained
that custody courts introduced the best interests of the child standard in the nineteenth century.
Courts continued to make custody awards based on gender preferences, however, until gender-
based custody decisions were rejected by the Supreme Court in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S.
636, 652 (1975), and in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979). See Zummo, 574 A.2d at
1135-37. For a discussion of the factors considered in a best interest evaluation, see text accompa-
nying notes 46-47 infra.
8. Pater, 588 N.E.2d at 797.
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A survey of over fifty state child custody cases since 1988 demonstrates
that many courts consider the religious beliefs and practices of parents in
determining custody of children. 9 In so doing, these courts make religious
preferences, endorsing one religion's training over either no training or an-
other religion's training for a child. By considering the parents' religious
beliefs and practices in child custody cases, many courts violate the free ex-
ercise rights of at least one of the custody contestants and risk violating the
Establishment Clause.
In 1989, in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU,'° the United
States Supreme Court implemented Justice O'Connor's "endorsement test"
in evaluating alleged Establishment Clause violations. Under that test, an
Establishment Clause violation occurs when the government "appear[s] to
take a position on questions of religious belief."" Since 1989, however, of
over fifty child custody cases surveyed that address religion, not one men-
tions the endorsement test.' 2 That only two decisions 3 cite the Supreme
Court cases developing the endorsement test raises serious concerns that
family law courts are ignoring the Supremacy and Establishment Clauses in
child custody cases. The failure of family law courts to implement a relevant
Supreme Court standard is a chilling revelation.
Courts need guiding rules to assist them in avoiding the constitutional
hazards that surface when they consider religion in child custody cases. One
proponent of continued court discretion under the best interests of the child
standard, Carl E. Schneider, advocates the development of "negative rules"
to facilitate custody decisionmaking:
The critics of the best-interest principle seem most worried about the use of
particular factors in making custody decisions-taking a parent's sexual mis-
conduct into account, for instance. Many of these bases for decision can easily,
clearly, and cheaply be attacked by direct prohibitions. Such prohibitions have
the advantage of sharply limiting judicial discretion in desired ways but only in
desired ways. Discretion in other, more appropriate, areas can remain essen-
tially unhampered.14
9. See text accompanying notes 115-171 infra.
10. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
11. Id. at 594; see also id. at 593-94 ("Whether the key word is 'endorsement,' 'favoritism,'
or 'promotion,' .... [t]he Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from ap-
pearing to take a position on questions of religious belief .... (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 687 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring))).
12. See text accompanying notes 115-171 infra.
13. See Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948, 953 (Idaho 1993) (using endorsement test lan-
guage but applying a different test); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1134, 1151-52, 1154 n.44
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (citing to endorsement test cases).
14. Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-
Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2296 (1991).
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This note suggests a "negative rule" prohibiting the consideration of religion
at the initial custody determination phase. The court may then consider re-
ligion only if it finds that the religious practices of the parent chosen in the
initial phase have harmed or are certain to harm the child. Such a procedural
and evidentiary rule would help prevent courts from making determinations
that violate the First Amendment. 15
Part I of this note reviews Supreme Court treatment of a parent's right to
raise her child and related First Amendment cases dealing with Free Exercise
and Establishment Clause issues. This part demonstrates that courts must
engage in a strict scrutiny analysis when considering a parent's religion in a
child custody case. Under this standard, courts can interfere with the free
exercise rights of parents only to safeguard the health and safety of children,
a compelling state interest. This part also tracks the development of the en-
dorsement test in Establishment Clause cases, and explains how this analysis
makes court examination of religion in child custody cases particularly
problematic.' 6 Specifically, the mere appearance of endorsing religion in
child custody determinations may violate the Establishment Clause. Analy-
sis of Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the use of a "negative rule,"
prohibiting family law courts from considering religion absent actual harm to
a child from religious practices.
Part II analyzes recent child custody cases that considered a parent's re-
ligious practices. This analysis separates the surveyed cases into four groups
based on the standards the courts used in determining custody: actual harm
cases, substantial threat cases, risk cases, and relevant issue cases. This part
discusses how effectively, or ineffectively, the different standards operate in
light of the preceding constitutional analysis. Part II concludes that only the
actual harm standard passes constitutional muster.
Part III, proposes what I call the New Osier-Actual Harm (NOAH) pro-
cedure-a standard designed to help ensure that courts do not violate the
Free Exercise or Establishment Clauses in child custody cases.17 Under
NOAH, religious issues would be excluded from an initial child custody de-
termination. Only after the initial determination, in a bifurcated proceeding,
would the court consider parental religious beliefs and practices. In this sec-
15. Cf Mitchell A. Tyner, Religious Freedom Issues in Domestic Relations Law, 8 B.Y.U. J.
PUB. L. 457, 475-76 (1994). Tyner endorsed the 1980 Osier procedural model, as does this note,
but he left intact the "substantial endangerment" standard of the original model. This note rejects
the substantial endangerment standard (analogous to the substantial threat test discussed herein) and
endorses instead the actual harm standard. Additionally, Tyner did not exhaustively analyze the
Supreme Court cases that justify modifying the Osier model.
16. See text accompanying notes 75-78 infra.
17. This test draws upon the test the Maine Supreme Court applied in Osier v. Osier, 410
A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980). The major difference is that Osier applied a substantial threat test in the
second phase, while NOAH requires a showing of actual harm to the child. See text accompanying
notes 172-173 infra.
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ond phase, only upon a predicate finding that religious beliefs and practices
were actually harming a child (a risk of harm would not suffice) could the
court modify its original determination. However, in so doing, the court
would be limited to using the least restrictive means available.
Part IV applies the NOAH test to some sample child custody cases and
demonstrates how it would improve their results. This part explains how the
elements of the NOAH procedure would enhance custody determinations
when issues such as religious discrimination, child abuse, differing parental
religious beliefs, and relocation arise. Within the confines of the best inter-
ests of the child standard, nationwide implementation of the NOAH proce-
dure, which is less prone to discretionary abuse and easier to implement than
vaguer standards, will protect cherished First Amendment and parental
rights.
I. PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A The Free Exercise Clause
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the right of par-
ents to raise their children as they deem best. In 1944, the Court held, in
Prince v. Massachusetts,18 "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor
hinder."19 Decades of decisions reaffirming this tenet "have by now made
plain beyond the need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right
to 'the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children'
is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants deference and, absent a
powerful countervailing interest, protection. '"' 20
That right is not absolute, however. The Prince Court weighed parental
rights, coupled with free exercise rights, against the powerful countervailing
interest of the state in safeguarding the welfare of children. In affirming a
guardian's criminal conviction for violating child labor laws by directing her
niece to distribute Jehovah's Witness literature on a street comer, the Court
reasoned that "neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond
18. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
19. Id. at 166 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)).
20. Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (appointment of counsel not
constitutionally required for indigent parents in every proceeding to terminate parental status)
(quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (unmarried fathers who have cared for their
children have a due process right to a hearing before children are declared wards of the state)); see
also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141-42 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the interest "of a parent and child in their relationship with each other... was among the first that
this Court acknowledged in its cases defining the 'liberty' protected by the Constitution").
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limitation. '21 Critical to the Court's holding was that Sarah Prince had vio-
lated an otherwise valid, secular child labor law.22 The Court distinguished
the regulation of children from that of adults, finding that "[t]he state's
authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of
adults. '2 3 Moreover, the Court emphasized the public nature of the activity
regulated-child labor-while also noting that the Court has "respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter."24
The Prince Court was careful to instruct lower courts not to interpret its
decision as carte blanche authority to trample parental and free exercise
rights. The Court admonished:
Our ruling does not extend beyond the facts the case presents. We neither
lay the foundation "for any [that is, every] state intervention in the indoctrina-
tion and participation of children in religion" which may be done "in the name
of their health and welfare" nor give warrant for "every limitation on their re-
ligious training and activities." The religious training and indoctrination of
children may be accomplished in many ways .... These [Court-acknowledged
ways] and all others except the public proclaiming of religion on the streets...
remain unaffected by the decision.25
Clearly, the Court intended its decision to be construed narrowly and in a
manner consistent with the peculiar facts at hand. The Prince Court thus
justified state usurpation of both the parental authority of a Jehovah's Wit-
ness and her free exercise rights because the exercise of those rights con-
flicted directly with child labor laws.
The next landmark decision to address religious and parental rights was
Wisconsin v. Yoder.26 There, the Supreme Court invalidated state action
similar to that in Prince when it considered the right of the Old Order Amish
to keep their children home from public schools after the eighth grade. De-
spite the existence of a valid, secular law mandating public school atten-
dance, the Court held that "[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its appli-
cation, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. '27 The Court also
found that the free exercise of religious beliefs includes the right to direct the
religious upbringing of one's children.2 8 In essence, the Court granted an
exception from state educational requirements for Amish religious practices.
21. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
22. See id. at 168-69.
23. Id. at 168.
24. Id. at 166.
25. Id. at 171 (quoting the dissenting opinions) (first alteration in original).
26. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
27. Id. at 220 (citing Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
28. See id. at 232-34 (identifying parents' interest in the religious education of their children
as fundamental); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) ("[Tlhose who
nurture [the child] and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
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The Yoder Court took great pains to distinguish Prince. First, the Court
noted how the "evils" associated with child labor motivated the Prince deci-
sion.29 In contrast, the Court opined that a child's early withdrawal from
public school did not pose any threat to social welfare or the child's physical
or mental health.30 Second, the Yoder Court emphasized that if it pro-
nounced judgment in favor of the state as it did in Prince, the state would "in
large measure influence, if not determine, the religious future of the [Amish]
child[ren]. ' '31 The Prince Court apparently did not fear such a result.
The Yoder Court also clarified the standard applicable in these types of
cases. When balancing the free exercise claims of the parents against the
state's interest, courts must apply heightened scrutiny.32 The Yoder decision
suggests that absent a showing that a parent's actions will "jeopardize" the
child's health or safety, a court may not regulate or restrict the religious be-
haviors of the parent:
[W]hen the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of
the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a "reasonable relation to
some purpose within the competency of the State" is required to sustain the va-
lidity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment. To be sure, the
power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject
to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize
the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social bur-
dens. 3
3
prepare him for additional obligations."); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (noting, in dicta, the right of parents to direct the religious upbringing of
their children). Describing the development of this right, the Yoder Court stated:
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for
the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing
of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition. If not
the first, perhaps the most significant statements of the Court in this area are found in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters ....
The duty to prepare the child for "additional obligations," referred to by the [Pierce]
Court, must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and ele-
ments of good citizenship.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-33 (quoting Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35).
29. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 229-30.
30. See id. at 230 (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)).
3 1. Id. at 232; cf. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 ("[Liberty] excludes any general power of the State
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The
child is not the mere creature of the State ... ").
The Yoder Court distinguished the Amish case from one in which the children and parents
might have divergent religious interests and preferences. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-31 (noting that
such a conflict was not at issue in the case).
32. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34.
33. Id. The Court also noted that where it had rejected free exercise challenges to regulations,
"[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety,
peace or order." Id. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,402-03 (1963)).
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The Yoder Court was wary of "intrusion by a State into family decisions in
the area of religious training.. .. ,,34
While Yoder and Prince focus on parental rights and free exercise
claims, neither directly applies to court consideration of religion in child
custody cases. The caveat in Prince cautions that the decision only limits
parents' rights to employ their children to proclaim religion on the streets;
the decision does not address the myriad other ways parents indoctrinate
their children. 35 The Yoder facts, involving a state statute mandating public
education, also differ significantly from the circumstances attendant to judi-
cial selection of parental custodians. Additionally, in Yoder and Prince, par-
ents faced criminal prosecution for the violation of valid, secular laws regu-
lating their children's conduct.
The state's action is quite different when parents dissolve their marriage.
The state judiciary becomes involved in such a proceeding to settle a private
dispute, not because of any violation of state law.36 Certainly, the state re-
tains an interest in protecting children in custody disputes, but this interest is
arguably no greater than the state's interest in protecting the children of all
types of households, functional and coherent, or dysfunctional and incoher-
ent. Even in a dissolution proceeding, the state must extend the deference to
parental dominion acknowledged by Yoder and Prince.37
Yoder and Prince nonetheless offer guidance to anticipate the Supreme
Court's response to consideration of religion in child custody cases. Under
Yoder, a court must presume the primacy of the parental right to raise and
educate children. This parental right and the free exercise of religious beliefs
include the right to manage the religious indoctrination of one's children.38
Only jeopardy to the health or safety of the child or a substantial threat to
public safety justifies state interference with these parental First Amendment
rights.39 Under Yoder, judicial interference with these rights would be re-
viewed with strict scrutiny.
However, in 1990 the Court moved away from Yoder's heightened scru-
tiny standard, in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
34. Id. at 231. The Court further explained that "the values of parental direction of the relig-
ious upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place
in our society." Id. at 213-214.
35. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944); see also text accompanying note
25 supra.
36. See Robert H. Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 226, 229 (1975) (seminal criticism of a broad best
interests test as being indeterminate and speculative).
37. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-234 (parents' fundamental interest in determining children's
religious upbringing); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 ("care and nurture of the child reside first in the par-
ents"); see also note 28 supra and accompanying text.
38. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232-33; see also note 34 supra.
39. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233-34; see also text accompanying note 33 supra.
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Oregon v. Smith.40 The Smith Court held that a state law prohibiting the sac-
ramental use of a hallucinogen does not violate the Free Exercise Clause,
stating, "[w]e have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that
the State is free to regulate. '41 Kent Greenawalt explains the holding:
In Smith, the Court held that religious claimants have no special privileges in
respect to laws of general application. If a reasonable law is neither directed
against a religious practice nor discriminates among religious groups, it may be
validly applied against people with religious objections. The state need not
satisfy any test beyond the easy task of showing that the law is otherwise
valid.
42
The Smith decision fails to provide clear guidance for child custody
cases for three reasons. First, the Smith Court specifically distinguished Yo-
der and like cases as involving free exercise rights in addition to parental
rights. The Court explained:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action
have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause
in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as ... the right of par-
ents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, to direct the education of
their children .... 43
Although the hybrid analysis in Smith may have been a "make-weight" to
justify a lower level of judicial scrutiny,44 it does distinguish Yoder and sug-
gests that cases like Yoder, involving both parental and free exercise rights,
should continue to receive strict scrutiny.
Second, like Yoder and Prince, Smith grappled with a religious practice
that violated an otherwise neutral criminal law. The Smith Court stated,
"Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for re-
40. 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (denying unemployment compensation to state employee who was
discharged for ceremonial use of peyote did not violate the Free Exercise Clause). Justices
O'Connor, Breyer, and Souter have contended that Smith has little precedential value and may have
been wrongly decided. See City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2176, 2186 (1997)
(O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, JJ., dissenting). Boerne, which held that Congress lacked the constitu-
tional authority to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, did not specifically overturn Smith,
however.
41. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-89.
42. Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REv. 323, 334 (1995). While Greenawalt contends that Smith "sharply
reduce[s] the significance of the Free Exercise Clause," he also notes that the clause may protect
"religious objectors [who] also claimi] parental rights." Id.
43. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)) (some citations
omitted). The Smith Court did not include Prince in the list of hybrid cases. The exclusion of
Prince is inconsistent with the plain language of that case. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944); see also text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
44. See Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 335 ("Assessing the relevance of the 'combination' or
'hybrid' analysis in Smith is hard. Most scholars assume this language was a make-weight to 'ex-
plain' Yoder that lacks enduring significance.").
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ligious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not
aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs."45 As noted earlier,
though, child custody disputes do not typically involve questions of whether
religious principles justify a violation of law. Rather, the issue is whether in
applying a standard of general applicability-the best interests of the child
standard-the court may consider the competing parents' religious practices.
Under the best interests of the child standard, courts can consider all
factors that affect a child's physical, emotional, intellectual, moral, and
(sometimes) spiritual welfare.46 Such factors include: which parent is more
closely bonded to the child, which parent feeds, clothes, bathes, and plays
with the child, which parent takes the child to the doctor and dentist, which
parent assists with homework and attends school functions, and which parent
can meet the needs of the child generally. A court may also consider where
the child will live and attend school, whether the child has supportive friends
and extended family in the area, whether the child will be injured by parental
feuding or by radically new circumstances, and any preferences that a teen-
ager may have regarding custody.47 Thus, courts can investigate the intimate
details of the parents' lives that may impact the well-being of the child. Ul-
timately, the court selects a custodian who will better meet the child's needs.
If both parents are equally qualified, the court awards the parents joint cus-
tody.
That the best interests of the child standard is intended to be, and may
even appear to be, facially neutral, does not mean that it is neutral in its ap-
plication, or that court consideration of religion is uniformly constitutional.4
The Supreme Court has struck down what appear to be facially neutral laws
when they are applied only against a particular religion. Subsequent to the
Smith decision, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
45. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95
(1940), overruled by West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
46. See, e.g., Kammerer v. Martin, No. 95-0665, 1995 WL 723249, at ***6 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App.
Dec. 7, 1995) (quoting Wisconsin statutory law concerning the factors to consider during a custody
determination); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1137 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (discussing best
interests factors generally).
47. While observing family law courts in session, I have heard all of these factors considered
during a best interests analysis. See generally UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A
U.L.A. 561 (amended 1973) (best interests of child standard); Daniel B. Griffith, The Best Interests
Standard: A Comparison of the State's Parens Patriae Authority and Judicial Oversight in Best
Interests Determinations for Children and Incompetent Patients, 7 ISSUES L. & MED. 283, 291-301
(1991) (discussing best interests inquiry in child custody proceedings); Andrea Charlow, Awarding
Custody: The Best Interests of the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 267-73
(1987) (criticizing the standard as overly vague and subject to abuse).
48. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995)
(O'Connor, J. concurring) ("[T]he Establishment Clause forbids a State from hiding behind the
application of formally neutral criteria and remaining studiously oblivious to the effects of its ac-
tions.").
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Hialeah,49 the Supreme Court determined that a ban on killing animals vio-
lated the free exercise rights of Santeria adherents who practice animal sacri-
fice as a form of religious devotion.50 Even though the Court found the
challenged ordinances facially neutral, it noted that the laws specifically tar-
geted Santeria sacrifice.5' The Court held that "[f]acial neutrality is not de-
terminative .... Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive
treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of
facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental
hostility which is masked as well as overt. '52
Neither hostility to a specific religion nor atheism motivated the adoption
of the best interests of the child standard. When courts deliberately consider
religion in child custody determinations, however, they take a facially neutral
standard and, with their broad discretion, use it to promote one religion over
another or one religion over no religion. Thus, juxtaposed against Lukumi,
Smith offers little guidance for child custody courts. Together they may even
demonstrate that the neutrality of the best interests standard can best be safe-
guarded by prohibiting the consideration of benign religious practices alto-
gether.
The third way Smith fails to provide guidance in child custody disputes
relates to its rejection of heightened scrutiny review. The Smith Court justi-
fied its rejection of the strict scrutiny standard in evaluating alleged free ex-
ercise violations by reasoning, "The government's ability to enforce gener-
ally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to
carry out other aspects of public policy, 'cannot depend on measuring the
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual develop-
ment.' ' 53 The Court explained that it invoked the compelling interest (strict
scrutiny) test to evaluate free exercise claims only when the government had
created a mechanism for individualized exemptions to generally applicable
laws.54 For instance, in unemployment compensation cases, such as Sherbert
v. Verner,55 the unemployment compensation administrative system allowed
the state to analyze individual free exercise claims for exemption.5 6 Smith
noted that such cases "stand for the proposition that where the State has in
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that
49. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
50. See id.
51. See id. at 535-540.
52. Id. at 534.
53. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (quot-
ing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,451 (1988)).
54. See id. at 884.
55. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
56. See id. at 405-06.
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system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason. '57 In
Smith, no mechanism existed for the evaluation of free exercise claims
against the otherwise valid and neutral Oregon criminal drug laws, and the
Court refused to extend the heightened scrutiny standard to that type of case.
Smith thus provides little guidance to child custody courts, since the state
does appear to have a system of individual exemptions in place for child
custody cases.
The best interests standard requires a case-by-case, individualized analy-
sis of the needs of the children and the relative talents and merits of both par-
ents.58 This is exactly the kind of system referred to in Smith that permits
individual free exercise exemptions. Thus, any denial of custody and result-
ing free exercise claims should afford the claimant a strict scrutiny review.
As Prince held over fifty years ago,59 the state should have to demonstrate a
sufficiently compelling, countervailing governmental interest to warrant re-
striction or denial of the parent's custody rights based on religious beliefs
and practices. We have come full circle.
B. The Constitutionality of Custody Cases-A Free Exercise Analysis
The Yoder decision confirmed that the free exercise right to indoctrinate
a child with religious principles is part of the parental bundle of rights.60 A
state can interfere with that right only if there is a "substantial threat" of
"harm to the physical or mental health of the child."'61 Nothing suggests that
this free exercise right dissipates when the parents are in conflict in a child
custody case.62
The state facilitates marital dissolution, in part, to provide assurances
that during the process at least one adult continues to support and care for the
children of the marriage, preventing their abandonment and becoming wards
of, and financial burdens upon, the state. When parents cannot agree who
will be primarily responsible for the children, the state decides. Unless it is
responding to specific allegations of harm to children, the state will other-
wise rarely intercede to regulate the care and maintenance of children. For
57. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).
58. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
59. See text accompanying notes 19-24 supra.
60. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,233 (1972).
61. Id. at 230.
62. Parents do not lose parental authority vis-a-vis the state when they separate from each
other. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-94 (1979) (state law requiring the unmar-
ried biological mother's, but not the unmarried biological father's ability to withhold consent to
child's adoption violates Equal Protection); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed fathers
have a due process right to a hearing on parental fitness before children are declared state wards
following the mother's death); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 546-50 (1965) (divorced parent
has a procedural due process right to notice of adoption proceedings by stepfather).
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example, the state would not be likely to dictate which married parent is to
provide childcare, regulate the hours each parent spends with the children,
plan meals, organize family holidays and vacations, specify the school chil-
dren must attend, direct the religious training of the children, or other matters
of like kind.63
When divorced or unmarried parents fail to agree on child custody, the
state chooses a custodian by evaluating the beliefs and behaviors of each ap-
plicant to determine who will better care for the child. In so doing, the state
employs the best interests of the child standard.64 When a court evaluates
parental religious practices, however, it should also use the reasoning and
methodology formulated in Yoder. The Yoder Court acknowledged the free
exercise right of the Amish to indoctrinate their children, and then examined
the state's competing interest in having children attend school. The Court
found that compulsory school attendance protects children by preparing them
to be self-sufficient individuals. 65 It is also intended to protect our political
system by creating an educated citizenry.66 The Court held, however, that
the one or two years of public education the Amish children would miss
"would do little to serve those [state] interests. '67
Using the Yoder reasoning, the inquiry in a child custody case should
center on whether the free exercise rights, or the benign religious indoctrina-
tion practices6S of potential guardians, hinder or promote the state's goal of
63. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977) (acknowledging a "private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter" (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158,
166 (1944))); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1140 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The Zummo court
suggested: "Parents in healthy marriages may disagree about important matters; and, despite seri-
ous, even irreconcilable, differences on important matters, the government could certainly not step
in, choose sides, and impose an orthodox uniformity in such matters to protect judicially or bureau-
cratically determined 'best interests' of the children of such parents." Id. (citing Parham v. J.R.,
442 U.S. 584 (1979)).
64. Cf Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303-04 (1993) (upholding INS regulation mandating
custody of potentially deportable juveniles who could not be released to guardians). The Reno
court held:
"The best interests of the child," a venerable phrase familiar from divorce proceedings, is a
proper and feasible criterion for making the decision as to which of two parents will be ac-
corded custody. But it is not traditionally the sole criterion-much less the sole constitutional
criterion-for other, less narrowly channeled judgments involving children, where their inter-
ests conflict in varying degrees with the interests of others.
Id. at 303-04.
65. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 222.
68. I focus on benign practices since the Yoder Court clearly distinguishes parental decisions
that jeopardize the health or safety of the child. See id. at 230. Those decisions invoke different
state interests and transform the court from private dispute mediator to child protector.
One might argue that a parent's failure to engage in religious practices for the child's spiritual
welfare, such as baptism, for example, might jeopardize the safety of the child by jeopardizing her
soul. Under separation of church and state, however, the state's interest extends only to the child's
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ensuring care for children. Some Americans may believe there is a correla-
tion between particular religious views and practices and superior childcare
talents. 69 However, an argument that, in general, Jews, Pagans, Hindus, or
theists make better or worse caretakers than Catholics, Muslims, Zoroastri-
ans, and atheists, is dubious at best.70 Moreover, any court that would dare to
dabble in such an evaluation would surely risk violating the Establishment
Clause.71
A family law court can satisfy the state goal of ensuring adequate child-
care even if it ignores the benign religious practices of custodial candidates.
Thus, consideration of benign religious practices does little to further the
state's interest in child custody cases. It follows, under Yoder, that courts
cannot justify the violation of free exercise rights of parents in a child cus-
tody context absent a substantial threat of harm to the child from the parent's
religious practices.
C. The Establishment Clause
Consideration of religion in child custody cases also raises Establishment
Clause concerns, particularly when courts confer custodial rights on a parent
temporal well-being. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (sustaining
state reimbursement for cost of transporting children to parochial schools as an extension of the
logic by which state-paid police protect schoolchildren regardless of whether they attend parochial
schools).
Whatever spiritual consequences may be visited upon the child by parental practices are be-
yond the state's responsibility even if they remain within the state's sphere of influence. Moreover,
the Establishment Clause specifically prevents the state from asserting its influence. In Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), Justice Blackmun wrote in his concurrence:
We have believed that religious freedom cannot exist in the absence of a free democratic gov-
emment, and that such a government cannot endure when there is fusion between religion and
the political regime. We have believed that religious freedom cannot thrive in the absence of a
vibrant religious community and that such a community cannot prosper when it is bound to the
secular. And we have believed that these were the animating principles behind the adoption of
the Establishment Clause. To that end, our cases have prohibited government endorsement of
religion, its sponsorship, and active involvement in religion, whether or not citizens were co-
erced to conform.
Id. at 609 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (warning that "courts must not presume.., the plausibility of a
religious claim").
69. For example, a parent once advised me against hiring an au pair or English nanny to care
for my daughter. She explained that Mormon girls provide better childcare because Mormonism
emphasizes the domestic parenting role for women of that faith.
70. But cf Donald. L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in
Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383, 408 (1989) ("Empirical
studies have shown that [a child's] well-being is clearly furthered by 'transcendence, or the capacity
to find purpose and meaning beyond one's self and the immediate,' but that traditional theism is not
the sole path to achieving that capacity." (quoting Ellison, Spiritual Well-Being: Conceptualization
and Measurement, J. PSYCHOL. & THEOLOGY 330, 338 (1983))).
71. See text accompanying notes 72-102 infra.
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with one particular religious faith rather than on the parent with another or no
faith.72 In Everson v. Board of Education,73 the Court evaluated the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause and held, "Neither a State nor the Fed-
eral Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."74
The Court perfected a test to determine whether governmental action
violates the Establishment Clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman.75 The three-part
Lemon test requires that governmental action must: (1) "have a secular leg-
islative purpose," (2) have a "principal or primary effect ... that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion," and (3) avoid "an excessive. . entanglement
with religion. '76 However, Supreme Court Justices, constitutional law schol-
ars, and others have criticized the Lemon test in the two decades since its
formulation.77 Greenawalt cautions that judges "should recognize that the
Supreme Court has definitely abandoned Lemon. '78
72. The Fourteenth Amendment governs state courts (including family law courts) and judi-
cial officers. A court's conferring custody based on religious considerations is state action that
could violate the Establishment Clause. See 'Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985) (legislators
may not "interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to worship, and to express himself in
accordance with... his own conscience"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14 (1948) ("action of
state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the state
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment").
73. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
74. Id. at 15; see also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-53 (affirming that the First Amendment free-
doms encompass the personal choice of any or no religion); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 36 (1992) (arguing that the Establishment
Clause "must cover some non-coercive forms of governmental favoritism toward religion-that is,
endorsement"). This neutrality principle continues to dominate Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 820-21, 841, 845 (1995).
75. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Lemon invalidated a 15% salary supplement to private school
teachers of secular subjects. See id. at 606-07.
76. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
77. See, e.g., Wallace, 472 U.S. at 63 (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to criticism by Jus-
tices O'Connor and Rehnquist); Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 359-79 (reviewing the fractured
application of Lemon in subsequent cases). Donald Beschle comments, "Separationists find the
[Lemon] test too loose in its acceptance of plausible secular state purposes and too pliable in its
quest for a primary secular effect. Accomodationists point to the 'Catch-22' nature of the entan-
glement clause as an obstacle to conscientious legislative attempts to satisfy the 'effects' test."
Beschle, supra note 70, at 394.
78. Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 361. But see Agostini v. Felton, 117 S. Ct. 1997, 2016
(1997) (holding that federal funding of remedial instruction by government employees to children at
sectarian schools does not violate Establishment Clause). In overturning Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985), and parts of the companion case, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1985), the Agostini Court reviewed the Ball Court application of the Lemon test. See Agostini,
117 S. Ct. at 2008-17.
The Agostini Court noted that "the general principles we use to evaluate whether government
aid violates the Establishment Clause have not changed since Aguilar was decided." Id. at 2010.
The Court evaluated the effect and entanglement aspects of the federal funding and found no Estab-
lishment Clause violation. Id. at 2009-16. The Court also concluded, "The same considerations
that justify this holding [Agostini] require us to conclude that this carefully constrained program
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While theorists have contemplated several alternative tests to determine
Establishment Clause violations, 79 the O'Connor "endorsement test" has re-
ceived the most sustained interest.80  In Lynch v. Donnelly,81 Justice
O'Connor suggested that the Establishment Clause prohibits two types of
government action. In her concurring opinion, she explained:
One is excessive entanglements with religious institutions, which may interfere
with the independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to gov-
ernment or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the relig-
ion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious
lines. The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or
disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accom-
panying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.82
The first prohibition closely resembles the third prong of the Lemon test,
warning against "excessive entanglement." However, the second admoni-
tion-that government action must neither endorse nor disapprove of relig-
ion-is significantly different from the first two prongs of Lemon.
The Lemon purpose and effects prongs focus literally on the stated pur-
pose and actual effects of governmental action or legislation. In her expla-
nation of the endorsement test, Justice O'Connor advised, "The proper in-
quiry under the purpose prong of Lemon, I submit, is whether the govern-
ment intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval of relig-
ion. '8 3 In applying the endorsement test, a court asks what the government
intends by its action, which is not necessarily the same as the stated purpose.
Justice O'Connor also counseled:
[T]he effect prong of the Lemon test is properly interpreted not to require in-
validation of a government practice merely because it in fact causes, even as a
primary effect, advancement or inhibition of religion.... What is crucial is that
also cannot reasonably be viewed as an endorsement of religion." Id. at 2016. Thus, the Court
sanctioned the use of both the Lemon and endorsement tests.
Whether the Court will employ the Lemon test in future Establishment Clause cases remains to
be seen. The Court may have used the Lemon test in Agostini only to parallel the contrasting rea-
soning of the Aguilar and Ball cases.
79. See generally Greenawalt, supra note 42 (reviewing the application of several recent tests
under the Religion Clauses).
80. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (adopting Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test for the first time). Greenawalt explains, however, "A majority of
Justices do agree that 'endorsement' is the crucial inquiry for certain kinds of cases, but no majority
agrees on the proper formulation of that test for at least some of these cases." Greenawalt, supra
note 42, at 361.
81. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). In Lynch, the Court found that a city did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause by displaying a nativity scene. See id. at 684-85.
82. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
83. Id. at 691.
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a government practice not have the effect of communicating a message of gov-
ernment endorsement or disapproval of religion.
84
This explanation emphasizes that the unconstitutionality of a message lies in
its perception as government endorsement, and not in whether the govern-
ment has, in reality, advanced or inhibited religion. This test, which ferrets
out the appearance of inappropriate endorsement, sweeps much more broadly
than one that requires actual advancement or inhibition of religion.
In Wallace v. Jaffree,85 Justice O'Connor further clarified the endorse-
ment test. She said in her concurrence, "The relevant issue is whether an
objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and imple-
mentation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement .... "86
Who is Justice O'Connor's intelligent objective observer? Not an "average"
person on the street, but one who, for example, is familiar with the legislative
history of a statute.
Justice O'Connor gave more guidance concerning the objective observer
in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Lat-
ter-Day Saints v. AmosYV She noted that something more than historical
facts determine whether the objective observer perceives a message of en-
dorsement: "Although evidentiary submissions may help answer it, the
question is, like the question whether racial or sex-based classifications
communicate an invidious message, in large part a legal question to be an-
swered on the basis of judicial interpretation of social facts." 88 This elabora-
tion leaves the qualifications of the objective observer frustratingly vague
and confusing. O'Connor's objective observer is the "reasonable person" in
tort law who, unlike the personification of community ideals, understands
complex statutes and their legislative histories. This observer can both per-
sonify community ideals and engage in sophisticated judicial interpretation
of the social elements he or she personifies. What remains unclear, in part, is
84. Id. at 691-92. Justice O'Connor added, "Every government practice must be judged in its
unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of relig-
ion." Id. at 694.
85. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
86. Id. at 76 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (citing Wallace and discussing the objective observer's perception of government ac-
tion); Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referencing the
objective observer's understanding of a state endorsing one particular day as the Sabbath).
87. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
88. Id. at 348 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693-94). In Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), Justice O'Connor wrote, "In this
respect, the applicable observer is similar to the 'reasonable person' in tort law, who 'is not to be
identified with any ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things' but is
'rather a personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the [collec-
tive] social judgment."' Id. at 779-80 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS,
R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON LAW OF TORTS 175 (5th ed. 1984)).
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whether (and how) the objective observer represents all communities and
how she harmonizes the reasonable person's conclusions with those of the
judicial historian and interpreter.89
The Amos objective observer might examine court consideration of re-
ligion in child custody disputes and receive "an invidious message" similar
to those associated with "racial or sex-based classifications." 90 In Palmore v.
Sidoti,91 the Court invalidated the withdrawal of custody of an infant from a
mother because she remarried a man of a different race. 92 The Court ruled,
"Such [racial] classifications are subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to
pass constitutional muster, they must be justified by a compelling govern-
mental interest and must be 'necessary... to the accomplishment' of their
legitimate purpose. '93
Is court consideration of religion necessary to accomplish the purpose of
selecting a custodian in a child custody case? Before the adoption of the best
interests of the child standard, courts routinely decided custody cases without
considering religion. Thus, religious classifications are not necessary to ac-
complish the task of choosing a custodian. 94 When domestic relations courts
89. In describing his notion of the reasonable observer, Justice Stevens opined:
It is especially important to take account of the perspective of a reasonable observer who may
not share the particular religious belief it expresses. A paramount purpose of the Establish-
ment Clause is to protect such a person from being made to feel like an outsider in matters of
faith, and a stranger in the political community....
... Justice O'Connor... presumes a reasonable observer so prescient as to understand
legal doctrines that this Court has not yet adopted.
Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 799, 802 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see id. at 779 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("In my view, proper application of the endorsement test requires that the reasonable
observer be deemed more informed than the casual passerby postulated by Justice Stevens.").
Kent Greenawalt suggests:
Further, since feelings of exclusion among members of minorities are so important, and
since the majority (Christians) take cultural dominance so much for granted that they may not
perceive endorsement of their position, judges should attend especially to how reasonable
members of minorities may react. For cases in which actual reactions are the vital concern,
Justices should not impute to "reasonable people" a knowledge of legal and political matters
that far exceeds that of ordinary people.
Greenawalt, supra note 42, at 374 (footnotes omitted).
90. Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693-94).
91. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
92. See id. at 434.
93. Id. at 432-33 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)). The Pater court
relied upon Palmore when it said, "[A] court may well violate the parent's constitutional rights if its
decision is improperly based on religious bias. The United States Constitution and the Ohio Con-
stitution forbid state action which interferes with the religious freedom of its citizens or prefers on
religion over another." Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794, 798 (Ohio 1992) (citation omitted).
94. See Beschle, supra note 70, at 384-89 (discussing how the determination of custody has
historically included several factors but not religion); see also Zumno v. Zummo, 574 A.2d. 1130,
1135-37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (discussing the history of "presumptive" standards used in child
custody cases before adoption of best interests standard).
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do consider religion, as when they consider race, their classifications and
conclusions should be subject to the "most exacting scrutiny."
Finally, when courts consider the religious affiliations of potential custo-
dians, they risk violating the neutrality principle by choosing one parent over
another, unless the parents' religious beliefs are exactly alike. 95 "The clear-
est command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination
cannot be officially preferred over another."96 The neutrality requirement
referred to here is similar to the one imposed in Board of Education of Kir-
yas Joel Village School District v. Grumet.97
The Kiryas Joel Court invalidated a statute that created a special school
district for Satmar Hasidim, disciples of a strict sect of Judaism. The Court
focused on the impermissible delegation of civil authority and held, "[T]he
difference [between what is permissible] lies in the distinction between a
government's purposeful delegation on the basis of religion and a delegation
on principles neutral to religion, to individuals whose religious identities are
incidental to their receipt of civic authority."98
One can fashion an analogy to Kiryas Joel in child custody cases. In
choosing a custodian, the family law court determines to whom the state will
delegate its parens patriae99 authority. Rather than make children of dis-
solving families wards of the state in cases where parents cannot decide who
will care for them, the state delegates its authority to the parent who will
serve the best interests of the children. Kiryas Joel stands for the proposition
that a state may not "deliberately delegate discretionary power to an individ-
ual, institution, or community on the ground of religious identity."' 00 It fol-
lows that a court may not delegate parental duties on the basis of religious
identity. This analogy spotlights the lack of neutrality courts display when
they consider religious affiliations in delegating their parens patriae author-
ity by choosing a custodian.
The Kiryas Joel Court emphasized, "[W]e have frequently relied explic-
itly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious groups or
95. See note 74 supra.
96. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488,
495 (1961) ("Neither [a State nor the Federal Government] can constitutionally pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."
(footnote omitted)).
97. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
98. Id. at 699.
99. "Parenspatriae originates from the English common law where the King had a royal pre-
rogative to act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants, idiots and lunatics. In
the United States, the parens patriae function belongs with the states." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1114 (6th ed. 1990).
100. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 699.
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individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges."' 1 When
courts consider the religion of contestants in child custody disputes, they
deny a benefit generally available to both parents-custodial rights-based
on religion. Thus, court consideration of religious beliefs in custody disputes
necessarily results in a judicial preference of one religion over another, un-
less the parents' religious beliefs are exactly alike. Moreover, such judicial
preferences also send the message of endorsement, thereby violating the Es-
tablishment Clause.102
D. The Constitutionality of Custody Cases-An Establishment Clause
Analysis
It is stunning that not one of fifty-three recent child custody cases in-
volving religion specifically referred to the O'Connor endorsement test, first
adopted by a Supreme Court majority almost a decade ago.'0 3 Several of the
cases used endorsement test language but made no thorough endorsement
test evaluation."' 4 Few cited or applied the virtually abandoned Lemon
test. 05
101. Id. at 704. The Court continued:
In Walz v. Tax Comm "n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970), for example, the Court
sustained a property tax exemption for religious properties in part because the State had "not
singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such," but had ex-
empted "a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations." And Bowen
v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 608 (1988), upheld a statute enlisting a "wide spectrum of organi-
zations" in addressing adolescent sexuality because the law was "neutral with respect to the
grantee's status as a sectarian or purely secular institution." See also Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (striking down sales tax exemption exclusively for religious publi-
cations); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'CONNOR, J., concur-
ring in judgment) (statute impermissibly "singles out Sabbath observers for special... protec-
tion without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and practices of
other private employees").
Id. at 704-05 (footnote and some citations omitted).
102. In Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), Justice
Stevens wrote: "The Establishment Clause does not merely prohibit the State from favoring one
religious sect over others. It also proscribes state action supporting the establishment of a number
of religions, as well as the official endorsement of religion in preference to nonreligion." Id. at 809
(Stevens, 3., dissenting) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985)). But see Beschle,
supra note 70, at 397 ("In broad terms, then, religion is considered to be a proper subject of inquiry
in custody disputes."); id. at 401 ("Religion may be a factor in custody cases even in the absence of
a denominational split between parents. In such cases, courts have often attempted to determine
which parent would provide the better religious atmosphere for the child.").
103. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 (1989) (adopting the endorsement
test as providing a "sound analytical framework for evaluating government use of religious sym-
bols").
104. See, e.g., McCown v. McCown, 649 A.2d 418, 422 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). In
McCown, the court declined to modify a decree ofjoint custody to provide that the children attend
Hebrew day school rather than private school after the mother converted to Orthodox Judaism. See
id. The court reasoned, "The orders which we affirm endorse neither the religion nor the culture of
either parent but are intended to insure that the children have the opportunity to participate in the
cultural household routine and religious practices of both parents." Id. (emphasis added). While
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This lack of influence by the Court is significant because the differences
between the Lemon and endorsement tests could produce differing results
when applied to court consideration of religion in child custody cases. Under
the Lemon test, court determination of which parent will serve the best inter-
ests of the child as custodian has a secular purpose: to guarantee that chil-
dren obtain adequate care following the dissolution of the marriage and do
not become financial burdens on the state. It is doubtful that courts intend to
endorse or inhibit religion in the process, but this will be explored later, in
Part IV.106
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the "principal or pri-
mary effect" of governmental action "neither advance[] nor inhibit[] relig-
ion."'' 7 The principal effect of the best interests evaluation is the selection of
a qualified caregiver. t0s One could argue that any advancement or inhibition
of religion is incidental' 09 or simply an accommodation of the religious needs
of the parties."t 0 One could also argue that religion is neither advanced nor
the McCown court cited no U.S. Supreme Court authority, it used the comfortably familiar word
"endorse" as it refused to require religious school attendance. The court explained, "Neither we,
nor the courts below, approve nor disapprove of the conversion. The courts do not choose between
religions." Id.
105. See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra. See also, e.g., Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d
948, 953 (Idaho 1993); Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1146 n.26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Bur-
rows v. Brady, 605 A.2d 1312, 1315 (RI. 1992).
106. But see Beschle, supra note 70, at 406 (discussing "possible secular purposes and effects
that might support the use of religion... in child custody ... determinations"); Johns v. Johns, 918
S.W.2d 728, 731 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996). In Johns, the father appealed a modification requiring him
to take his children to Sunday school and church. The court justified the restriction of the father's
visitation time based on religious instruction furthering the best interests of the children. The court
explained:
Because appellant [the father] has the right to visit his children every other week, his refusal to
see that they attend Sunday School and worship services would mean they would miss half of
the possible opportunities for the moral instruction that their mother has been trying to instill.
Although we express neither approval nor disapproval for whatever religious beliefs the chil-
dren may be learning, the fact remains that appellant offered no alternative method for in-
structing his children in moral values during the time that they would have otherwise been re-
ceiving that instruction through Sunday School and church attendance.
Id. Thus, the court rationalized its restriction by suggesting that it was merely interested in the
children's moral education. Unfortunately, the court does not avoid the appearance of the endorse-
ment of religion over nonreligion. The substitution of the word "moral" for "religious" should not
save this case from First Amendment purview.
107. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
108. The "best interests" of the child are not necessarily the primary effect. No court foresees
the future as a soothsayer or prophet. All a court knows for certain is that it designates a guardian,
hopefully the best one available for the child.
109. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), wherein the
Court held: "as a matter of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we have consistently held that it is
no violation of government to enact neutral policies that happen to benefit religion." Id. at 764.
110. See Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705
(1994) ("[W]e do not deny that the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious needs by
alleviating special burdens."); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327,334 (1987).
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inhibited generally since, for example, atheists as well as Hindus, Pagans and
fundamentalist Christians receive custody of their children in individual
cases. We have no clear evidence that courts discriminate against any par-
ticular religious group or against atheists in awarding custody."' But, in any
given case, choosing a Hindu over a Jewish parent, or a Catholic over a Pa-
gan, offers the appearance of endorsing Hindu or Catholic views over the
competing parents' views.
Some courts might opine that the objective observer will understand that
the court's consideration of religion in custody cases is in furtherance of the
child's best interests, and is not a particular endorsement of one religion over
another. Some scholars have argued that religious training of any kind bene-
fits children. That view may or may not be correct."l 2 The fact remains that
in choosing between competing religions, the judiciary necessarily adds its
imprimatur to one religion, to the detriment of the other. Such a ruling nec-
essarily creates an appearance of judicially approved religious beliefs and
practices and, therefore, implicates the Establishment Clause.13
111. The number of cases like Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992), however, involv-
ing parents who are Jehovah's Witnesses, suggests discrimination against this particular faith occurs
in family law courts. See, e.g., note 134 infra and accompanying text.
112. See, e.g., Beschle, supra note 70, at 410-11. Beschle argues that, broadly defined, relig-
ion generates mental and emotional well-being in children and therefore serves a secular interest.
This argument is problematic. The Supreme Court has held that the posting of the Ten Command-
ments served secular purposes too, but still violated the Establishment Clause. See Stone v. Gra-
ham, 449 U.S. 39,41 (1980).
Additionally, Beschle confuses whose job it is to generate the mental and emotional well-
being of children. The parents or custodians play this role. The state does so only by default when
it finds the parents unfit. Because courts use the best interests standard to determine who will act as
guardian, Beschle's analysis should focus on whether consideration of religion has a legitimate
purpose and effect in choosing a skilled caregiver. I would argue that it does not. For example, a
skilled, loving, and attentive Hindu caregiver should be able to provide for a Jewish child. Fur-
thermore, such consideration certainly gives the impression that government is endorsing religion.
Finally, Beschle suggests:
If the definition of religion is expanded, or ifa narrowly defined religion is one of several
factors in establishing a commitment to a value system transcending self-interest, the estab-
lishment clause should be no bar to the use of religion as a factor in determining the best inter-
ests of the child. This use of religion has a legitimate secular purpose and effect, treats tradi-
tional religion no better or worse than competing systems of ultimate values, and does not en-
dorse traditional religion.
Beschle, supra note 70, at 419. This use of religion may not endorse traditional religion but it does
endorse Beschle's version of "religion." Moreover, the entanglement that will result both from a
court's analysis of which religions promote the transcendence of self-interest and from regulating
the use of religion will render his scheme unconstitutional under all tests.
113. For scholarly discussions of the Establishment Clause implications in child custody dis-
putes, see Beschle, supra note 70, at 416-26 (consideration of "religion" in broad sense does not
violate the Establishment Clause); R. Collin Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May Be
Unconstitutional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 25, 51-62,
72-74 (1981) (suggesting that courts may consider which parent better serves a child's religious
needs, as long as they do not evaluate the merits of a particular religion); Steven M. Zarowny, The
Religious Upbringing of Children After Divorce, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 160, 164-66 (1980)
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The objective observer must remember that the best interests of the child
standard is one that merely facilitates the determination of which parent will
better care for the children of the dissolving marriage.' 14 Religion is no more
a gauge of child raising proficiency than is gender or race. In the absence of
evidence that a parent's particular religious affiliation harms a child, court
consideration of the parent's religious views and practices appears to be an
unwarranted violation of the Establishment Clause.
II. RECENT CHILD CUSTODY CASES
A. The Four Categories
Given the constitutional rights of parents, one might wonder how family
law courts consider religion in light of the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. Family law courts vary in their interpretation and application of
constitutional law when making custody determinations in the best interests
of the child. Some states allow courts to consider the child's spiritual life as
a factor. 15 Some courts evaluate which parent better fosters the child's re-
ligious training. ' 6 Other states allow their courts to consider religious be-
liefs and practices in determining the general qualifications of a custodian. ' 7
(arguing that a judge can hide religious motivations within the discretion accorded under the best
interests standard); Note, The Establishment Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Fac-
toring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1702 (1984) (arguing that consid-
eration of religion is only constitutional where the child has religious convictions of her own).
114. See, e.g., Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). The Zummo
court explained:
The statist notion that the government may supercede parental authority in order to ensure bu-
reaucratically or judicially determined "best interests" of children has been rejected as repug-
nant to American traditions. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979); accord Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923) (rejecting the models of Aristotelian guardianship and
Spartan state collectivization of youth as antithetical to American freedoms). Judges and state
officials are deemed ill-equipped to second-guess parents, and are precluded from intervening
in absence of "powerful countervailing interests." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 27 (1981).
Id. (some citations omitted). But see Beschle, supra note 70, at 406 ("Most child custody decisions
acknowledge that ensuring the child's best interests is the goal of such proceedings."). However,
Beschle loses sight of the fact that courts do not have free reign to provide for the best interests of
the child. Courts must choose parents who will serve in the child's best interests.
115. See, e.g., Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1142 (trial courts are required to consider all factors
which bear on a child's "spiritual well-being" when making a custody decision); Burrows v. Brady,
605 A.2d 1312, 1315 (LI. 1992) (the child's spiritual as well as moral and physical well-being is
important).
116. See, e.g., Aldous v. Aldous, 99 A.D.2d 197, 199 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (considering re-
ligion when a child has developed religious ties and when "those needs can be better served by one
parent than the other").
117. See, e.g., Gancas v. Schultz, 683 A.2d 1207, 1213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) ("Religion while
not determinative, 'is an important matter and should be given some consideration in child custody
matters."' (quoting Boylan v. Boylan, 577 A.2d 218, 219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), overruled on other
grounds by G.B. v. M.M.B., 670 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)).
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Many courts consider religious practices only when acts threaten to harm a
child,118 and some courts exclude consideration of religion unless specific
behaviors actually harm a child.1 19
To understand state implementation of federal constitutional law, I stud-
ied a number of child custody cases decided after 1988 to evaluate whether
states were acknowledging or reflecting the endorsement test, which entered
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in 1989.120
The cases separate into four categories, depending on the level of the risk
of harm to a child that a party must demonstrate before a court will base its
custody decision on the religious beliefs and practices of the contestants: (1)
actual harm, (2) a substantial threat of harm, (3) only some risk of harm, or
(4) no risk at all, suggesting that religion is always a relevant factor to be
considered by the court.121 In no case did a court specifically acknowledge
118. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gersovitz, 779 P.2d 883, 885 (Mont. 1989) ("Clourts will
examine religious practices which interfere with the child's general welfare."); Palmer v. Palmer,
545 N.W.2d 751, 755 (Neb. 1996) (limiting parental rights only when "religious practices 'pose an
immediate and substantial threat to a child's temporal well-being' (quoting LeDoux v. LeDoux,
452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990))).
119. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 509 (1996) (relying on Yoder to uphold joint custody when father could not show that mother's
religious activities substantially harmed the child); Osteraas v. Osteraas, 859 P.2d 948 (Idaho 1993)
(endorsing the principle that courts should not consider religion in custody disputes without com-
pelling reasons, such as the effect of a dispute over religion on a child's welfare); Pater v. Pater, 588
N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992) (emphasizing that parents have a right both to free exercise of their relig-
ion and to educate their children).
120. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
121. Scholars examining custody decisions group them in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Tyner,
supra note 15, at 471 (dividing cases into those which treat religion as part of a multi-factor analy-
sis and those which require special circumstances before religion can be considered). I do not
group cases by state because it may be misleading to place a state in a particular group based solely
on recent custody decisions. For example, Gago v. Acevedo, 625 N.Y.S.2d 250 (App. Div. 1995),
De Luca v. De Luca, 609 N.Y.S.2d 80 (App. Div. 1994), and Marjorie G. v. Stephen G., 592
N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1992), might lead one to believe that New York does not consider religion
unless a parent's religious practices are actually harming a child
In 1984, however, the appellate division, in Aldous v. Aldous, 473 N.Y.S.2d 60 (App. Div.
1984) established a test for considering religion in child custody cases:
When presented as an issue, religion may be considered as one of the factors in determining
the best interest of a child, although it alone may not be the determinative factor .... New
York courts will consider religion in a custody dispute when a child has developed actual re-
ligious ties to a specific religion and those needs can be served better by one parent than the
other.., when a religious belief violates a State statute.., and when a religious belief poses a
threat to a child's well-being ....
Id. at 62 (citations omitted). Thus, while Gago, De Luca, and Marjorie G. suggest that New York
belongs in Group 1 because the courts based their decisions on a requirement of actual harm,
Aldous would be in Group 4-relevant issue cases-because of the finst prong of the Aldous test.
This first prong does not require actual harm or illegal behavior (the second prong) before the court
can consider the parents' religion.
Within New York, then, there is no strict rule as to when a court may consider religion. This
suggests that decisions may be inconsistent within the state. New New York cases, relying on
Aldous, for instance, could place that state in Group 4. The only way to determine the relative po-
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and implement the endorsement test. Indeed, only two courts even cited the
cases developing the endorsement test. 122
1. Group 1: actual harm cases.
Tables I and II (see appendix)123 include cases in which religion became
a factor in the best interests evaluation only when a parent's religious prac-
tices (1) actually harmed a child or (2) would harm a child in the future. 124
Twenty-two of the fifty-three cases studied (41%) fall into Group 1.
Pater v. Pater,125 the case that introduces this note, provides a good ex-
ample of decisions in this category.126 The Pater court began its analysis
with the proposition that "court[s] may consider the religious practices of the
parents in order to protect the best interests of a child. ' ' 127 The court then
engaged in an informative discussion of free exercise rights and the funda-
mental right of parents to educate their children. 128 The court cited Prince
for the counterpoint that a compelling state interest justifies interference with
these rights. 129 The Pater court then concluded that "the state's compelling
interest in protecting children from physical or mental harm clearly allows a
sitions of all fifty states is through a state-by-state exhaustive survey, which is beyond the scope of
this note.
122. See note 13 supra.
123. I have placed custody modification cases in tables separate from original custody deci-
sions for several reasons. First, this note suggests that religion should not be part of the original
determination of custody. After the initial determination or in a modification, I agree that court
consideration of religion is appropriate to accommodate free exercise claims and to make limited
restrictions in response to actually harmful practices. Second, the issues are typically narrower in
modification cases because custody has already been determined. Finally, modifications may in-
volve different standards than initial determinations of custody. For example, many courts require a
material change of circumstances before they will consider making a modification. Having made
this cautionary remark, I will not separate modifications into distinct subsets in the text because
many of the issues they address are identical to those in original custody determinations.
124. Group 1-actual harm cases-does not include cases in which there is a risk of harm to
the child. Some courts, however, required a threshold level of harm before the court allowed relig-
ious beliefs and practices to influence the custody determination. See, e.g., Kendall v. Kendall, 687
N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (Mass. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3422 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1998)
(No. 97-1756) ("The plaintiff was required to demonstrate 'in detail' that exposure to the defen-
dant's religion caused the children 'substantial injury, physical or emotional, and [would] have a
like harmful tendency for the future."' (quoting Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 608 (Mass.
1981))).
125. 588 N.E.2d 794 (Ohio 1992).
126. A case like Pater conceivably fits into Group 4 because of its reaffirmation that a family
law court can consider the religious practices of the parents. Because the court also holds, however,
that religion cannot provide the basis for a decision unless the child will actually be harmed by the
practice, I placed it in Group 1.
127. Pater, 588 N.E.2d at 797.
128. See id. at 797-99.
129. See id. at 798-99.
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court to deny custody to a parent who will not provide for the physical and
mental needs of the child."'130
Apparently, the trial court heard evidence concerning the mother, Jenni-
fer Pater, and her conversion from Catholicism to the Jehovah's Witness
faith.'3 ' (The father remained Catholic.) Witnesses testified that Jennifer no
longer attended Catholic Mass. 32 The father's counsel interrogated Jennifer
as to whether Jehovah's Witnesses salute the flag, associate with non-
members, and celebrate holidays, among other issues. 133 One expert testified
that Jehovah's Witnesses experience mental illness more frequently than
those of other faiths. 134 The Pater high court reversed the lower courts,
holding that "custody may not be denied to a parent solely because she will
not encourage her child to salute the flag, celebrate holidays, or participate in
extracurricular activities." 135 The court noted, "Today, we adopt the majority
rule that a court may not restrict a non-custodial parent's right to expose his
or her child to religious beliefs, unless the conflict between the parents' re-
ligious beliefs is [negatively] affecting the child's general welfare."'1 36
2. Group 2: substantial threat cases.
Zummo v. Zummo 137 is a good example of a case in which the court con-
sidered whether the parents' religious beliefs posed a substantial threat to a
child's welfare. In Zummo, the Pennsylvania superior court provided an in-
cisive analysis of the current state of child custody law as it relates to relig-
ious issues, and in doing so surveyed Yoder, Allegheny, and Smith, among
other cases. 138  When Pamela and David Zummo married, Pamela was a
practicing Jew and David was a sporadically practicing Catholic. They
orally agreed to raise their children in the Jewish faith. t39 The parents de-
130. Id. at 799.
131. See id. at 796.
132. See id.
133. See id. The judge excluded testimony that Jehovah's Witnesses do not allow their chil-
dren to have blood transfusions as being too speculative and, therefore, irrelevant. Id. at 797 n.1;
see also text accompanying notes 220-225 infra.
134. See Pater, 588 N.E.2d at 796. In response, the court said, "This testimony was a blatant
attempt to stereotype an entire religion. Regardless of the rate of mental illness among an entire
group, that evidence does not prove that the religion in question will negatively affect a particular
individual." Id. at 800; see also text accompanying notes 157-158 infra.
135. Pater, 588 N.E.2d at 797.
136. Id. at 801. One wonders how beliefs affect a child's well-being. The Court continued,
"Because a divorce is a stressful event for a child, a court must carefully separate the distress caused
by that event from any distress allegedly caused by religious conflict." Id.
137. 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
138. See id. at 1134-35.
139. See id. at 1141.
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cided to share custody of the children post-dissolution, but could not agree
on the children's religious training.140
The trial court resolved the issue by placing restrictions on David's visi-
tation rights.' 4 ' On appeal, the superior court held that agreements to raise
children in a particular faith when one parent later objects are invalid.1 42 The
court based its decision on three points:
1) such agreements are generally too vague to demonstrate a meeting of
minds, or to provide an adequate basis for objective enforcement;
2) enforcement of such an agreement would promote a particular religion,
serve little or no secular purpose, and would excessively entangle the
courts in religious matters; and,
3) enforcement would be contrary to a public policy embodied in the First
Amendment Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (as well as their
state equivalents) that parents be free to doubt, question, and change their
beliefs, and that they be free to instruct their children in accordance with
those beliefs. 143
Relying on the notion of religious freedom, the superior court concluded,
"Thus, while we agree that a parent's religious freedom may yield to other
compelling interests, we conclude that it may not be bargained away."' 44
The language from Yoder furnishes the standard adopted in Zummo and
other substantial threat cases found in Table III (see appendix). 45 The
140. See id. at 1141-42.
141. See id; see also note 151 infra.
142. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144; see also Abbo v. Briskin, 660 So. 2d 1157, 1161 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) ("When the matter involves the religious training and beliefs of the child, we
do not agree that the court may make a decision in favor of a specific religion over the objection of
the other parent. ... A child's religion is no proper business of judges.") (citation omitted). But see
Hoefers v. Jones, 672 A.2d 1299 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994), aff'dper curiam, 672 A.2d 1177
(N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1996) (court enforcement of negotiated joint custody agreement in which
father agreed to pay for education at religiously affiliated school did not violate Free Exercise
Clause because father could still practice his faith).
143. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1144 (citations omitted).
144. Id. at 1148; see also In re Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339 (Ct App.), cert. de-
nied, 117 S. Ct 509 (1996). Before Martin and Marsha Weiss married, Marsha converted from the
Baptist to the Jewish faith. At that time, she executed a document promising to raise her children as
Jews. Id. at 341. The couple divorced in 1993 and received joint custody of their son. The father
appealed, alleging that the trial court erred in failing to restrict Marsha's efforts to involve the child
in her religious activities. Id. at 342. Whereas the Zummo court promoted a standard that involved
"a substantial threat of present or future physical or emotional harm," Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1157
(emphasis added), the Weiss court followed California precedent and dictated that courts look for "a
clear affirmative showing that these religious activities [are] harmful to the [child]." Weiss, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 346 (quoting Mentry v. Mentry, 190 Cal. Rptr. 843, 847). See also id. at 342 ("A parent
will not be enjoined from involving a child with the parent's religious activities absent a clear and
affirmative showing of harm."). The Weiss court refused to enforce the "contract," finding that "the
prevention of harm to the child, which was the concern of Mentry, is a compelling state interest"
Id. at 346.
145. Interestingly, more than half of the cases that appear in Table I (see appendix) hail
from Nebraska.
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Zummo court summarized the standard in its opinion: "The United States
Supreme Court has specifically held that parental authority in matters of re-
ligious upbringing may be encroached upon, only upon a showing of a 'sub-
stantial threat' of 'physical or mental harm to the child, or to the public
safety, peace, order, or welfare.""' 146 Only competent evidence of a substan-
tial threat of harm to the child, introduced by the parent requesting the re-
striction, would justify the restriction of the other parent. 147
The Zummo court ruled, "We find that the requirement of a 'substantial
threat' of 'physical or mental harm to the child' is applicable to proposed
restrictions on a parent's post-divorce parental rights regarding the religious
upbringing of his or her children."'148 The court held that any restriction on a
parent is limited to "the least intrusive means adequate to prevent the speci-
fied harm."'149 Applying these standards, the Zummo court found no sub-
stantial threat of harm to the children and concluded that both parents had the
right to inculcate religious beliefs in their children. 50 The court then invali-
dated the restriction that prevented David from taking the children to Catho-
lic services.'
The substantial threat test differs from the actual harm test by introduc-
ing uncertainty into the evaluation. Under the actual harm test, if the child
has suffered or will suffer harm in the future, a court can intervene. Words
such as "risk," "endanger, .... threat," "jeopardize," and "imperil," and phrases
like "may harm," and "might harm" appear in the application of the substan-
tial threat evaluation but not in the actual harm analysis. Unfortunately,
many courts use the language of both tests as if they were interchangeable, or
otherwise conflate the two.' 52
3. Group 3: risk cases.
In five cases surveyed, courts allowed religious affiliations to impact the
custody determination when only some risk of harm threatened the children.
146. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1138 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,230 (1972)).
147. See id. at 1157.
148. Id. at 1141 (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205); see also id. at 1154-55. The Zummo court
did not distinguish between post-dissolution parents and divorcing parents, reasoning that the threat
of harm justified state interference regardless of marital status. Id. at 1139-40.
149. Id. at 1157.
150. See id.
151. See id. The court determined, however, that the trial court could designate time each
Sunday for the children to attend religious activities with Pamela, as well. This allocation of time
constituted an accommodation for Pamela and not a restriction of David's time. The court posited
that as long as David received a fair allocation and similar accommodations, the court tread on
neutral ground. Id.
152. See, e.g., id. at 1138 (using language of the actual harm test instead of that of the sub-
stantial threat test). Whenever substantial threat language justifies the final ruling, I have placed the
case in Group 2-substantial threat cases.
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These cases are identified in Table V (see appendix). Constitutional law rec-
ognizes a significant difference between a substantial risk of harm as op-
posed to any risk of harm. Yoder, for example, required a "substantial threat"
of "physical or mental harm" to the child, "or to the public safety, peace, or-
der, or welfare."' 53 If a court considers religious affiliation upon a showing
of only a minimal risk or some risk of harm, the threshold requirement of
Yoder is likely unmet. With less than "substantial" or "imminent" or "seri-
ous" risk, the state may not have a sufficiently compelling interest to over-
ride a parent's Yoder rights.
Petersen v. Rogers154 typifies this category of cases and exposes the op-
portunity for religious discrimination and impermissible questioning by the
trial court concerning religious beliefs when only some risk of harm to the
child is required. 55 In this case, a couple whose interlocutory adoption of a
child had been set aside petitioned for custody. The trial court awarded cus-
tody to the biological parents. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that
the trial court had impermissibly questioned the petitioning couple about
their faith, known as The Way International.
The appellate court explained, "The general rule is that a limited inquiry
into the religious practices of the parties is permissible if such practices may
adversely affect the physical or mental health or safety of the child .... 156
153. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,230 (1972).
154. 433 S.E.2d 770 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 445 S.E.2d 901 (N.C.
1994).
155. Cf. text accompanying notes 192-212 infra (discussing Group 4-relevant issue--cases
involving religious discrimination), See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, No. C0-95-1363, 1996 WL
70978, at *I (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1996); In re Marriage of Gersovitz, 779 P.2d 883 (Mont.
1989). In Gersovitz, the father appealed a custody determination that named the mother custodian.
The father argued that her selection of a non-Jewish school interfered with his right to raise the
child as a Jew. The difference between this case and the substantial threat cases rests with the
court's enunciated standard for consideration of religion. The court said it would "examine relig-
ious practices which interfere with the child's general welfare." Id. at 885 (emphasis added). The
court found no such interference, holding, "[A]n award of custody for the purpose of religious edu-
cation should not dominate other elements which comprise the best interests of this particular
child." Id.
The basis of the Murphy case was a challenge to an order of custody to the mother with re-
strictions on the father's visitation. Both parents had belonged to a minority religious sect and had
lived in a church community. After the mother left the church and community, she alleged physical
and emotional abuse. The court visitation restriction prevented the father from visiting with the
children on church property or in the presence of other church members. The court justified re-
strictions on visitation when "that visitation is likely to endanger the child's physical or emotional
health or impair the emotional development of the child." Murphy, 1996 WL 70978, at *1 (empha-
sis added). Finding a history of physical abuse and alleged sexual misconduct, the court affirmed
the restrictions. It noted that the father remained free to discuss his religion with the children dur-
ing his visits. Id. at *3.
156. Peterson, 433 S.E.2d at 775. The Petersen court specifically rejected the actual harm
test:
Although some courts have only permitted evidence showing actual harm to the child, see
Quiner, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 516, we find a broader rule allowing inquiry into actual or potential
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The appellate court established that under this standard a trial court could
consider the child's spiritual welfare, but could not inquire into religious be-
liefs. Thus, while the Peterson court itself did not engage in religious dis-
crimination, the mere risk standard it adopted opened the door for both re-
ligious discrimination and impermissible questioning at the trial court level.
In particular, the appellate court criticized the admission of testimony
from Ms. Kisser, a representative of The Cult Awareness Network:
To allow Ms. Kisser to speculate that the general practices and beliefs of mem-
bers might be detrimental to children is to condemn the entire membership of
The Way as unsuitable parents.... This result would certainly produce a chill-
ing effect upon litigants in future cases where one spouse was a member of The
Way or of some other lesser-known religion. 157
This passage highlights several important points. First, it demonstrates
the dubious utility of certain types of expert testimony regarding parental
fitness. Second, it illustrates how discrimination against one or two indi-
viduals leads to discrimination against entire religious groups. Third, and
most importantly, it clarifies that trial courts have an affirmative duty to pre-
vent religious discrimination in the courtroom. As the Peterson court deter-
mined, a laissez-faire approach by the judiciary is unacceptable.158
As the cases in this category demonstrate, requiring only a threshold
showing that a religious practice may harm a child affords the opportunity
for religious inquiry and discrimination. The risk standard favors state in-
vestigation into parents' religious beliefs, thereby threatening violation of the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
4. Group 4: relevant issue eases.
The last category of cases-relevant issue cases-includes decisions in
which the court requires no actual harm, no substantial threat of harm, nor
even a risk of harm before it considers a parent's religious practices. The
harm to be more desirable. See Short, 698 P.2d at 1313 (court found actual harm standard too
restrictive and adopted standard of whether beliefs or practices were "reasonably likely" to
cause present or future harm).
Id. (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 777 (citations omitted). In the sentence preceding this passage, the court reasoned,
"Absent any evidence that Paul was adversely affected or would be adversely affected in the future
by the religious practices, the court's acquiescence in the extensive inquiry was impermissible." Id.
This remark uses the language of the actual harm test; however, because the court specifically dis-
avowed the stricter test, I treated this case as a risk case. This case serves as another example of
how courts sometimes create confusion by using the language of more than one standard. See text
accompanying note 152 supra.
158. See also Stolarick v. Novak, 584 A.2d 1034 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (rejecting trial court's
decision to take children from their father's stable home based solely on his fundamentalist Chris-
tian beliefs).
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Lange case' 59 illustrates this standard. Robert Lange appealed a visitation
restriction that granted him only supervised visitation rights until he could
demonstrate that he would not "impose" his Christian fundamentalist relig-
ious views on his children. 160 The appellate court affirmed the order, relying
on a Wisconsin law that affords the custodial parent exclusive control over
the children's religion. 161
The appellate court agreed with the trial court that joint custody would
not work for the Langes because Robert's religious fundamentalism caused
him to insist on making all decisions. 162 The court approved the choice of
the mother, Elizabeth Lange, as custodian and noted that it would have or-
dered "reasonable visitation" for Robert but could not because he had dis-
obeyed temporary orders restricting his religious indoctrination of the chil-
dren. 163 Without requiring any risk of harm to the children, the court justi-
fied the visitation restrictions:
159. Lange v. Lange, 502 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
160. See id. at 144-45.
161. See id. at 146. The court added, "[T]he custodial parent's exclusive right to choose the
religion is meaningless without protection from subversion." Id; see also notes 163 & 187 infra and
accompanying text.
162. See Lange, 502 N.W.2d at 145. The Lange court also determined that Robert's "relig-
ious beliefs concerning the role of females is [sic] detrimental to the children and the children are
confused by the different religious teachings of the parties." Id. The court did not explain why the
U.S. Constitution permitted it to judge Robert's religious beliefs detrimental. See note 136 supra.
163. See Lange, 502 N.W.2d at 145-46. Often courts choose one custodial parent to control
the child's formal religious training, reasoning that the best interests of the child require noncontra-
dictory religious education. See LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990) (affirning cus-
todial mother's right to control child's religious training, in part because father's religion posed
immediate emotional harm to child); In re Marriage of Oswald, 847 P.2d 251 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(invalidating visitation award to paternal grandmother who wished to take child to her church be-
cause custodial parent has right to determine child's religious training). In Marjorie G. v. Stephen
G., 592 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct. 1992), the court affirmed its policy of noninterference in the child's
upbringing absent a showing of harm, and acknowledged the right of the custodial mother to deter-
mine the child's religion. Id. at 210. However, the court specifically permitted the father to include
the children in his Jewish religious activities "as long as no attempt is made to indoctrinate the chil-
dren with any purely theological or ideological dogmas, principles or beliefs that are unacceptable
to the [mother's faith]." Id. at 212.
This opinion illustrates the inherent conflict in states where the custodial parent obtains exclu-
sive control of the child's religious training. The court cannot restrict the noncustodial parent's
Yoder right to teach the child his religion absent a substantial threat of or actual harm to the child
resulting from the mixed religious training. Neither can the court interfere with the custodian's
legislative or judicial right to control the religious training of the child. The two proscriptions are at
odds and lead courts to issue confusing instructions such as the one in Marjorie G., which forces the
father to assess the mother's religious principles in order to avoid contradicting them. See also
S.E.L. v. J.W.W., 541 N.Y.S.2d 675, 679 (Fam. Ct. 1989) ("J.W. will be permitted to take Natalie
to Jehovah's Witness services on Sunday but shall not involve her any further except that he may
answer casual questions which she might ask him. No other exposure to Jehovah's Witness doc-
trine and activities will be permitted ... ").
Legislatures and courts need to address this dilemma. Using the NOAH procedure, courts
would ignore religion when making the initial custody determination and allow both parents to
provide the child with the religious training of his or her choice. If harm resulted from the mixed
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While we emphatically affirm Robert's [free exercise] right under the
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions to hold and profess his religious be-
liefs, he cannot engage in conduct causing his children to reject the religion
Elizabeth has chosen for their children....
.... [The free exercise right] does not include the right to engage in relig-
ious conduct, such as proselytizing, that runs afoul of an otherwise valid law. 164
The court relied on Smith165 to justify the Wisconsin law that gives major
decisionmaking privileges to the custodial parent. 166 The Oregon drug laws
at issue in Smith were neutral laws that resulted in the prohibition of religious
use of peyote. Just as these laws were otherwise valid, so the Wisconsin law
was a valid, neutral law that prohibited Robert from sharing in the religious
indoctrination of his children. 67 The irony is that the Wisconsin appellate
court never even mentioned Wisconsin v. Yoder.
B. The Results of a Constitutionality Review of Recent Custody Cases
The cases represented in Group 1-actual harm cases-required that pa-
rental practices actually harm children before the state interfered with a Yo-
der right in making a custody determination. Group 2's substantial threat
cases reflect the Yoder test. Cases from Group 3-risk cases-and cases
from Group 4--relevant issue cases-do not meet the Yoder test. Courts re-
quired less than a "substantial threat" of harm before they allowed religious
practices and beliefs to influence custody determinations. These determina-
tions from Groups 3 and 4, therefore, violate the Free Exercise Clause and
unconstitutionally abridge the parental right to religious freedom. Thus,
training, the parties could seek court intervention and the court would be justified in restricting the
parents' practices. For a discussion of the effects of mixed religious training, see note 233 infra.
164. Lange, 502 N.W.2d at 147-48 (citations omitted). The court explained that its restriction
did not prevent Robert from discussing religion with his children. He simply could not "impose"
his religious views nor cause them to reject their mother's religion. Id. at 147. This is a doubtful
distinction since Robert could not obtain unsupervised visits until he proved he would not "impose"
his religious views on the children. It appears quite plausible that the effect of this restriction was to
silence him completely, if he wanted to earn unsupervised visitation with his children.
165. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
166. See Lange, 502 N.W.2d at 148.
167. See id. at 148-49. In his dissent, Justice Dykman reminded the majority that Smith dis-
tinguished cases, including Yoder, that involved the combination of free exercise rights with other
fundamental rights. Id. at 150; see also City of Boeme v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997) (striking
down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, noting that it extended beyond the free exercise of
religion). In the majority opinion, Justice Gartzke responded to this point by saying that the
Lange's was not a hybrid situation like Yoder in that Robert lost the parental right to choose his
children's religion when he lost custody. See Lange, 502 N.W.2d at 148-49. This argument begs
the question. Robert may have lost custody due to his religious beliefs in violation of his First
Amendment rights. The laws that deprived him of his Yoder rights may not have been neutrally
applied.
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sixteen of fifty-three cases (30%) were arguably decided in violation of the
Constitution.
The losing parents in the cases in Groups 3 and 4 lost more than their
tder rights; they may have also lost custody and other attendant nonrelig-
ious rights. When a court fails to apply a constitutional threshold test before
considering parental religious practices or beliefs, it also risks depriving a
deserving parent of full parental rights to care for and nurture his or her
child.
Even those courts in Group 2 that applied the substantial threat test may
have violated parents' right to be free from religious discrimination and state
interference with religious beliefs and practices. Palmore v. Sidoti' 68 arose
in a similar context, involving race discrimination in child custody determi-
nations. In that case, the Supreme Court held that uncertain or hypothetical
harm was insufficient to justify interference with a parent's right to marry
someone of another race. The Palmore Court refused to permit the "hypo-
thetical effects of private racial prejudice"1 69 to influence a custody determi-
nation, rejecting the idea of "possible injury" stemming from racial bias.170
Therefore, the Court refused to sanction the custody court's consideration of
the race of a custodian or her partner, and thus, in so doing, refused to en-
dorse racial prejudice by giving effect to private biases. 171
When religious practices pose a threat of harm, even a "substantial
threat," the harm, like the potential for harm in Palmore, is hypothetical but
not actual. If family law courts adopted the same standard for considering
religious practices as the Palmore Court adopted for racial bias, then all of
the substantial threat cases would have to be reconsidered because many of
those courts endorsed religious discrimination by giving effect to the hypo-
thetical threat of harm posed by one parent's religious practices. Palmore
refused to consider race absent a showing of actual harm. If one extended
this reasoning to consideration of religion then only 41% of the surveyed
cases-the actual harm cases--employed an appropriate standard for consid-
ering parental free exercise rights. Moreover, that no case discussed and im-
plemented the endorsement test suggests widespread disregard of Establish-
ment Clause rights.
168. 466 U.S. 429 (1983).
169. Id. at 433 (quoting Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 260-61 (1971) (White, J., dis-
senting)).
170. See id.
171. See id. ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect.").
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III. THE NOAH SOLUTION
I propose a uniform procedure that would address the problems dis-
cussed above. The "New Osier-Actual Harm" (NOAH) procedure com-
bines the stricter review of the actual harm standard with the process sug-
gested by the court in Osier v. Osier.'72 NOAH resolves the key problems
encountered by family courts considering religion. It protects each parent's
right to the free exercise of religion and avoids the impression that a court
endorses one religion over another or no religion, while still safeguarding
children from actual harm caused by their parents' religious practices.
In Osier, the court suggested that a "divorce court should make a pre-
liminary determination of the child's best interest, without giving any consid-
eration to either parent's religious practices."'173 If the court, for nonrelig-
ious reasons, initially resolves the custody dispute by choosing the parent
with uncontroversial religious practices, the process ends after this best-
interests analysis. If, however, the losing parent protests the initial custody
award based on the winning parent's religious practices, the court may pro-
ceed to the second phase of a bifurcated proceeding. The court may then
evaluate the consequential impact of those religious practices, to determine
whether they pose a threat of actual harm to the child.
During the second phase, "the court must make a threshold factual de-
termination that the child's temporal well-being is immediately and substan-
tially endangered by the religious practice."' 74 If the religious practices do
not so endanger the child, the second phase analysis ends and the custodial
determination remains unchanged.
If, however, the court finds that the religious practices do substantially
endanger the child, the court must balance the conflicting interests and mod-
ify the original determination to achieve "the least possible infringement
upon the parent's liberty interests consistent with the child's well-being."' 75
The Osier court also required the trial court to make "specific findings of
fact' on the basis of record evidence to support its decision. 76
NOAH differs from the Osier procedure in the standard of harm to be
applied. The Osier court relied on a substantial threat test for the evaluation
of the religious practices. However, Palmore77 suggests that this standard is
not strict enough to avoid impermissible religious discrimination. What the
Palmore Court explained about racial discrimination is equally applicable to
religious discrimination: "[A] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
172. 410 A.2d 1027 (Me. 1980).
173. Id. at 1029.
174. Id. at 1030.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
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was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on
race. Classifying persons according to their race is more likely to reflect ra-
cial prejudice than legitimate public concerns .... 178
Extending this equal protection argument from race to religion in cus-
tody cases is both logically consistent and doctrinally necessary. Just as the
Establishment Clause prevents government endorsement and inhibition of
religion, the Equal Protection Clause179 mandates equal treatment of all per-
sons similarly situated. In his concurring opinion in Kiryas Joel °80 Justice
Kennedy compared the two clauses:
[T]he Establishment Clause forbids the government to use religion as a line-
drawing criterion. In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the Equal
Protection Clause. Just as the government may not segregate people on account
of their race, so too it may not segregate on the basis of religion. The danger of
stigma and stirred animosities is no less acute for religious line-drawing than
for racial. 18 I
Justice O'Connor endorsed this reasoning. In her concurring opinion, she
affirmed that "[a]bsent the most unusual circumstances, one's religion ought
not affect one's legal rights or duties or benefits."'182 Thus, a failure to ex-
tend Palmore could implicate serious equal protection issues.1
83
178. Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
179. The Equal Protection Clause provides that no state shall "deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
180. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
181. Id. at 728 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 715 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
183. One might argue that Palmore is not pertinent to child custody cases. In Palmore, big-
oted third persons, and not the African American stepfather, posed the hypothetical risk of harm to
the child. If the Court had denied custody to the Caucasian mother, the Court would have given
effect to harmful prejudice. The religion cases may appear different because the behavior of a par-
ent poses a substantial threat of harm to the child.
Palmore is apropos for two reasons, however. First, many of the custody cases involving re-
ligion involve a threat of harm more like that described in Palmore than may be initially apparent.
For example, in Paler, the father expressed the concern that the child would "be socially ostracized"
because the mother, a Jehovah's Witness, prevented the child from celebrating birthdays and holi-
days, saluting the flag, and socializing with non-Witnesses. See Pater v. Pater, 588 N.E.2d 794, 799
(Ohio 1992). The mother's behaviors themselves were not harmful to the child. Only the social
disapproval of and prejudice against the mother's dictates would have harmed the child. Had the
Paler court denied the mother custody, it would have given effect to the popular bias against the
practices of Jehovah's Witnesses. Thus, the potential harm in Paler was very much like the hypo-
thetical harm rejected in Palnzore.
Second, the precedential value of Palmore lies not in who posed the threat of harm to the child
but in what, if anything, justified racial classifications. Recognizing that a fear of harm from pri-
vate prejudice motivated the lower court decision, the Court refused to surrender to that fear and
give effect to prejudice. See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 430-31. In the custody cases involving religion
and no actual harm to the child, fear of harm from the free exercise of religion justifies classifica-
tions in the substantial threat cases. A court that surrenders to this fear gives effect to the inhibition
of religious free exercise. At the very least, a court risks the appearance of inhibiting religion and
violation of the Establishment Clause. Palmore stands for the proposition that fear of hypothetical
May 1998] 1643
STANFORD LAWREVIEW
The Constitution should have no more tolerance for religious discrimi-
nation in the guise of best interest determinations than it does for racially
motivated justifications. Substantial risk of harm was sufficient to protect
the uncontested religious rights of the Amish in Yoder,184 but actual harm
should be required where a court must choose between competing religious
views, in order to avoid discrimination and Establishment Clause violations.
Hypothetical harm is constitutionally insufficient. Application of the actual
harm standard, currently used in many states and seen in 41% of the sur-
veyed cases, not only complements Palmore, it helps prevent religious bias
by restricting judicial discretion.
Application of the NOAH procedure and the exclusion of all discussion
of religious beliefs and practices during the initial phase is not a complicated
task.185 Courts retain the discretion they require to resolve difficult custody
issues, including the ability to determine the degree of harm stemming from
a parent's religious practices and whether to fashion restrictions on those
practices where the child is involved. 86 Under NOAH, however, these ele-
ments are kept separate and identifiable.
Where the court has made the initial custody determination, without con-
sidering religion, the custodial parent controls the formal religious education
of the child.187 The noncustodial parent retains his or her right to inculcate
religious beliefs in the child. 88 Only upon a modification request and a
showing of actual harm from the mixed religious training could the court
restrict the parent's religious inculcation practices, using the least restrictive
means possible. Alternatively, if a mature child asserts a religious identity
contrary to that of both parents, the court would accommodate the child's
harm cannot justify classifications based on race or creed, and provides valuable guidance on this
point.
184. See text accompanying notes 26-34 supra.
185. The NOAH procedure also provides guidance where there is no initial determination of
custody. For example, if a party requests a change of custody, the court would apply any relevant
standards for modifications, such as a material change of circumstances, and then apply the NOAH
analysis.
186. See, e.g., Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228, 1232-33 (Mass. 1997), petition for cert.
filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3422 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1998) (No. 97-1756) ("Other states have struggled to define
what constitutes substantial harm .... We adhere to the line of cases requiring clear evidence of
substantial harm.").
187. Allowing the custodial parent to select the child's religion is completely consistent with
the laws of many states. See, e.g., Lange v. Lange, 502 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993)
(quoting Wisconsin statutes granting custodial parents the power to make "major decisions" for the
child, including "decisions regarding.., choice of school and religion").
188. Although Yoder did not address custody, it did affirm parents' rights in general to decide
the religious education of their children. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). But see
note 163 supra (discussing conflicts that arise when one parent controls religious training); text
accompanying notes 226-258 infra (demonstrating application of NOAH to mixed-training cases).
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free exercise right only upon a showing that a failure to do so would actually
harm the child.189
Where the parents share joint custody but fail to agree on the selection of
a parochial school, under NOAH the court would refuse to hear evidence
concerning the schools' religious affiliations. Instead, if a choice of school
were the issue, the court would employ the best interests standard, ignoring
the religious affiliations of the particular educational institutions. Thus, the
court would consider factors such as academic reputation, state accreditation,
and athletic and arts programs. Only upon a showing of actual harm to the
child would the court consider the school's religious affiliation.
One could argue that the NOAH procedure might increase the perception
of bias since findings and possible modification orders would be explicitly
based on religious practices. However, the requirement that the losing parent
satisfy the actual harm standard provides the key safeguard. During the sec-
ond phase, the court would employ a strict scrutiny analysis requiring a com-
pelling state interest in the children's health and safety before infringing
upon the parents' religious freedom. Because the actual harm test would be
employed, and because only the least restrictive means would be used to sat-
isfy the state's compelling interest, the court could justify impinging on a
parent's First Amendment rights, if that were unavoidable.
The existing best interests standard will work more effectively by adding
NOAH's "negative rule," which prevents court consideration of religion ab-
sent actual harm. The NOAH procedure better serves a child's best interests
by safeguarding against religious discrimination that sometimes prevents the
more qualified parent from receiving custody. Thus, to return to the original
Pater v. Pater example,190 the NOAH procedure would have prevented the
trial court from even considering Jennifer Pater's benign religious practices.
189. The Zummo court held that constitutional law prevented courts from determining the re-
ligious identity of children. See Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1149-50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
Only when children themselves assert a religious identity, having "reached sufficient maturity and
intellectual development to understand the significance of such an assertion," can a court consider
the religious identity of the child. Id. at 1149. The court opined that no uniform age conclusively
evidenced maturity but estimated that children twelve or older would demonstrate such maturity;
children younger than eight could not form such a religious identity. See id. What the Zummo
court would do with information concerning the religious identity of a child remains unclear, since
the issue was not reached because the Zummo children were too young to have developed religious
identities. Presumably, the court would consider the child's asserted identity as a preference to be
with the parent that would foster, or at least not stifle, that religious identity. Any other considera-
tion might lead to the problem of court endorsement of that parent's religion.
None of the cases surveyed involved children who challenged the rights of a parent to deter-
mine their religious training. The Zummo court contemplated such an event, however, and sug-
gested that U.S. Supreme Court precedent strongly indicated that the Court would honor the paren-
tal prerogative to control the religious indoctrination of the child. See id. at 1149-50 (citing Yoder,
406 U.S. at 231-32; Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603-04 (1979) (rejecting analogous claim by
child concerning medical treatment)).
190. See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
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From the outset of the proceedings, Bobby Pater could have remained with
his mother, his primary caregiver since birth.
In judicial determinations of custody, the NOAH procedure provides the
guidance that courts desperately need in choosing between potential custodi-
ans with competing religious views. NOAH requires courts to focus first on
the temporal well-being of children. Without this rule, court consideration of
religion threatens both the constitutional rights of parents and the best inter-
ests of their children.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE NOAH PROCEDURE IN PARTICULAR CUSTODY
CASES
By applying the NOAH procedure to actual cases decided using other
standards, one learns how the resulting custody determinations would differ
and be improved. My survey of over fifty recent child custody cases re-
vealed four common fact patterns or themes of dispute19 1 that will help ana-
lyze how NOAH improves the adjudication of these cases. They are: (1)
relevant issue cases in which the court impermissibly considers the parent's
religion as one factor in the best interests determination, (2) child abuse and
medical cases, (3) religious training disputes in which the alleged harm is
often not obvious and is not supported by verifiable evidence, and (4) relo-
cation cases that-implicate important policy issues.
A. The Relevant Issue Cases and Religious Discrimination
The efficacy of the NOAH standard in preventing the unconstitutional
violation of Free Exercise rights appears most readily when NOAH is ap-
plied in cases previously decided using the relevant issue standard. In these
cases, the potential for discrimination was blatant and often realized. 92 This
discrimination resulted when the court directly examined the parents' relig-
ions during its determination of the child's best interests; under this standard,
religion is a permissible "relevant issue" like residence location and parental
bonding.
In the Texas case of Alaniz v. Alaniz,193 the lower court permitted the
jury to consider the parents' religions in a custody dispute. The mother, a
Jehovah's Witness, appealed the jury's award of custody to the father, a Ro-
191. Note that these categories are not the same as those discussed above, see Part II supra,
which relate to the different standards the courts used to determine custody.
192. While outright religious discrimination appears most dramatically in the context of the
relevant issue cases, religious bias surfaces in all four groups.
193. 867 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).
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man Catholic. 194 The appellate court noted that both parents "were consci-
entious and loving."195 It considered whether the trial court had properly
instructed the jury regarding the parties' constitutional rights and the appro-
priate standard for considering their religious affiliations. The appellate
court found reversible error and concluded:
The jury should have known that the [mother's] beliefs which the jury might
have considered unusual were not grounds for depriving her from being named
managing conservator unless they [sic] concluded that her beliefs, teachings, or
practices were illegal, immoral, or would be harmful to the children .... We
conclude that what is immoral or harmful should be left to the jury to apply
community standards. What one jury might consider immoral, i.e. gambling,
playing a lottery, drinking to excess, homosexual conduct, or abortion,-an-
other jury might not.196
Even though the court remanded this case based on an impermissible
evaluation of the mother's religion, the standard set by the court of appeals
still highlights several problems that NOAH would prevent. First, the Texas
appellate court still permitted the jurors to judge a parent's religious beliefs
immoral. Such license to equate immorality with actual harm gives legal
weight to disapproval of a minority religion that may not attract "moral" ap-
proval in the local community. Moreover, equating immorality with actual
harm obfuscates the threshold level of harm required before the state can de-
prive a parent of custody. Purportedly immoral beliefs might have abso-
lutely no negative impact on a child, let alone rise to the level of actual
harm. 197
Second, if jurors find those heart-felt religious beliefs immoral, the par-
ent can lose custody. Third, it allows popular community opinion to displace
the United States Constitution. Fourth, this Texas standard sanctions the
deprivation of parental rights when a parent exercises other constitutionally
protected rights, such as the right to abortion. 98 Finally, permitting juries to
decide custody invites even greater inconsistency. What one jury considers
immoral another may not. If a judge denied custody to a Jehovah's Witness
because her faith was "immoral," an appellate court could reverse. The
194. See id. at 54-55. Texas allows a jury to decide a child custody matter. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 105.002 (vest 1996) (providing that a party to a family law dispute may request a
jury, except in adoption cases).
195. Alaniz, 867 S.W.2d at 55.
196. Id. at 57 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the court cautioned that judges should exclude
attacks upon a party's theology. See id. at 57 n.3.
197. For discussions concerning the inquiry into religious beliefs versus the inquiry into
harmful practices, see note 162 supra; note 259 infra; text accompanying notes 155-156 supra.
198. The Supreme Court has made it clear that local mores cannot circumscribe constitutional
liberties, no matter how locally unpopular the exercise of those right may be. See Planned Parent-
hood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (redefining but upholding the right to abortion); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a protected right to abortion that is beyond the purview of state crimi-
nal statutes).
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Texas rule, in combination with its jury system, affords unconstrained op-
portunity for religious bias. Not only do members of minority religions suf-
fer under this system, but the best interests of the children can be obscured
by hostility toward their parents' religious beliefs.
If the NOAH procedure had been applied in Alaniz, the jury would not
have heard evidence concerning the mother's Jehovah's Witness faith until
after the initial custody determination. If the father had been awarded cus-
tody, the mother could not have claimed discrimination since her religion
would never have been considered. If the mother had been named managing
conservator in the first phase, the father could have raised the issue of the
mother's religion for consideration in the second phase. Only by submitting
evidence that the mother's behaviors were actually harming or would actu-
ally harm the children could the father have then obtained a modification of
the initial determination.
Application of the NOAH procedure would have significantly reduced
the opportunity for and appearance of religious bias. During phase one of
the NOAH procedure, the best interest of the child, rather than the morality
of the mother's beliefs, would have received more focused attention. When
distracted by unfamiliar religious beliefs and practices, and the expression of
religious bias by witnesses or litigants and their counsel, jurors cannot devote
their full attention to the child's needs and to who best meets those needs.
Moreover, the NOAH procedure might have streamlined the process,
avoiding appeals and repeat jury trials, conserving the time and assets of both
the courts and the parties. Finally, application of the NOAH procedure
would make for much more internally consistent law in jurisdictions that use
juries in custody cases, because the juries would not be continually evaluat-
ing the morality of the religious beliefs and practices of minority religions
and potential custodians.
Similar to Texas law, Mississippi law permits a court to reject parents
whose religious practices it deems immoral. 99  In Muhammad v.
Muhammad,200 a father belonging to the New Nation of Islam appealed a
dissolution decree that awarded custody to the mother.201 Before the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court, he argued, in part, that the chancellor below had im-
199. See Harris v. Harris, 343 So. 2d 762, 764 (Miss. 1977) (noting that courts may consider
immoral practices); see also text accompanying note 196 supra. In Harris, the court overturned the
disqualification of a snake handling fundamentalist mother, stating that "[t]he chancery court had
no authority to dictate to Mrs. Harris what religion she should teach her child so long as it did not
involve exposing him... to what society in general deems immoral practices." Id. In part because
snake handling presumably fails to constitute an immoral practice, the appellate court reversed the
decision depriving Mrs. Harris of custody. Id.
200. 622 So. 2d 1239 (Miss. 1993).
201. The case arose from the father's suing for custody, with a cross complaint from the
mother suing for divorce and custody "on the ground of habitual cruel and inhuman treatment." Id.
at 1240. A chancellor found for the mother. See id. at 1241.
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properly disparaged his religion. The supreme court gave a lengthy descrip-
tion of the father's Black Muslim beliefs and practices, quoted long portions
of the trial transcript,202 and concluded:
The chancellor did engage in inappropriate judicial conduct with his sua sponte
interjection of personal opinion. This served, however, only to expose a view
held by the chancellor that in ordinary circumstances would be present but
tacit.... The record simply does not support the contention that the chancel-
lor's views so overwhelmed his reason that his decision on the issues cannot be
accorded the same degree of respect as is ordinarily enjoyed by the findings of a
trial court. Where the parties have competing religious views it is impossible to
have both views represented by a single jurist. This is especially true where, as
here, religious doctrine embrace [sic] a negative view about a particular race
[Caucasian]. As to this basis for reversal, we can say with confidence that the
chancellor should be affirmed. 203
This passage betrays the supreme court's own bias. After listing a number of
the father's beliefs and behaviors that many Americans, especially American
women, might find offensive, the supreme court used sympathy to excuse
clear bias on the part of the lower court. Because the chancellor was open
about his bias, somehow the effects of that bias were excusable.
The supreme court implied that the father's racist religious views justi-
fied the trial judge's hostility, or at least the judge's inability to represent the
religious viewpoints of all parties. A judge need not represent the religious
views of any party, however. Moreover, the First Amendment bars open dis-
approval and inhibition of religious beliefs. The dissent lamented the chan-
cellor's remarks: "His displeasure with the teachings and tenets of this re-
ligious group [Black Muslim] was obvious," noting that "[a]lthough I would
202. The supreme court described in detail the way the family lived, emphasizing how the
mother and child were treated in the New Nation of Islam community called "the University":
Virtually every aspect of life of the University is impacted by religious doctrine. The so-
cial and family structure is strongly paternal. Men are viewed as the maintainers of their wives
and children. Women are required to submit to their husbands. The role of the woman is
viewed primarily as being the helpmate of her husband. Child care is one of her chief respon-
sibilities. Women make no decisions. They cannot leave the confines of the community with-
out the permission of their husband. Members of the faith are not allowed to ingest alcohol,
tobacco, drugs or other intoxicating substances. Neither are they allowed to eat red meat. Al-
though the food supply is adequate in quantity, the diet at the University is fairly limited to
beans, broccoli, fish, bread, cauliflower, and sometimes com. Meals are restricted to one per
day for adults. Fasting from these meals periodically occurs. Women are required to breast-
feed their children. At least some of the milk and juices received by women through the
Women, Infants and Children (WIC) program go [sic] to the operation of a bakery. Mail is
subject to being censored.
Id. at 1242. One wonders whether the inclusion of these facts, mingling a discussion of the father's
religion with descriptions of how the mother and children lived, could have had any effect but to
allow the supreme court to enforce its own biases against the religion as part of its custody decision.
Perpetuating this mixed consideration on review did nothing to help the supreme court identify the
impermissible biases, and permitted the initial unconstitutional endorsement of one religion over
another.
203. Id. at 1248 (citation omitted).
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be reluctant to term the chancellor's behavior a violation of the constitutional
right to religious freedom, his conduct cannot be discounted and undermines
confidence in his determination of child custody."204
A central question left unanswered by this case is why no one addressed
the Establishment Clause issue. Here the Lukumi case, 205 in which the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated an apparently neutral law that made Santeria
animal sacrifice illegal, provides guidance on this issue. The Lukumi Court
admonished: "The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to re-
ligious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state in-
tervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all offi-
cials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to
the rights it secures. '206 This Supreme Court holding specifically abjures
state intervention motivated by religious hostility.
In Muhammad, the chancellor's bias tainted his motivations. Hostile to
Black Muslims, as the City of Hialeah was to Santeria adherents, the chan-
cellor intervened and disqualified the father from becoming custodian of his
children. To determine that the chancellor's comments violated the Estab-
lishment Clause, the Mississippi Supreme Court, an objective observer, could
have applied either the Lemon test 20 7 or the O'Connor endorsement test.20S
Either way, the chancellor's comments amount to clear judicial disapproval
of the father's faith. The custody award to the mother reinforced the appear-
ance of bias. Had the court acknowledged the Establishment Clause issue, it
would have lessened the appearance of bias, even if other interests had sup-
ported awarding the mother custody.
The application of the NOAH test in cases involving generally unpopular
faiths and people with politically incorrect practices might appear to lead to
equally unpopular decisions, if it allows the parent with controversial prac-
tices to obtain custody. But NOAH is a procedural provision, not a substan-
tive one. It protects the constitutional religious interests of the parents, but
leaves intact the secular portions of traditional best interests analysis.
Through the use of the actual harm standard, children are still protected
against injury arising from religious practices.
Applying NOAH to the Muhammad case provides a clear example of the
difference such a procedure could make. With the NOAH rule the same
court that denied custody to the Black Muslim father would be prohibited
204. Id. at 1252 (Smith, J., dissenting).
205. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). See note 49
supra and accompanying text.
206. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 547.
207. See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra.
208. See text accompanying notes 79-89 supra.
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from considering the parties' religions until after it had made an initial de-
termination of custody.
In the first phase, Mrs. Muhammad could present nonreligious evidence
of the living conditions at the New Nation of Islam community, such as the
"terrible overcrowding, '209 the unaccredited school, 210 and the lack of
food.21' Also in phase one, the father could present evidence that he ab-
stained from tobacco, alcohol, and red meat, and that he loved and cared for
his children. The phase one determination would reveal only the court's
consideration of the children's best interests, and would not involve an un-
constitutional consideration of religion.
If the court awarded Mrs. Muhammad custody in phase one, the father
could appeal that decision in a second phase. In that phase, he could argue
that his religion mandated fasting and a special school, and that he should not
lose custody because of his free exercise of his religion. In this second
phase, the court would consider whether the particular behaviors actually
harmed the children. If the court were to determine that the deprivation of
food and lack of accreditation did not harm the children, it could change its
original decision to grant the mother custody with a memorandum of factual
findings to support its change. The court could still find, however, that fast-
ing and substandard schooling harmed the children, and affirm its phase one
determination of custody.
Likewise, if the court awarded Mr. Muhammad custody in the first
phase, the mother could raise the issue of his religious practices in a second
phase. The court would have to evaluate whether the father's religious con-
duct actually harmed the children. In phase two, for example, a child psy-
chologist who had examined the children might testify that the manner in
which the father spoke to and treated women and Caucasians caused the
children to have nightmares or withdraw emotionally.212 Alternatively, one
could imagine that Mr. Muhammad's practices did not actually harm the
children, but merely encouraged unpopular attitudes. If the court found,
based on proffered evidence, that the father's religiously motivated sexist
and racist attitudes resulted in behaviors that actually harmed the children,
the court could change its phase one determination, and grant custody to the
mother.
Depending on the facts available, the court might determine, in phase
two, that Mr. Muhammad's conduct was so harmful that the father should
receive only restricted visitation rights. The court would have to justify such
209. Muhammad, 622 So. 2d at 1247.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 1248.
212. Cf Lange v. Lange, 502 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993) (finding "religious be-
liefs concerning the role of females ... detrimental to the children").
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a dramatic change from its phase one determination, however, with detailed
findings of fact that clarified why the proposed modification was the least
restrictive alternative. Alternatively, the court might decide that an order
enjoining the specific harmful conduct would be the least restrictive modifi-
cation available.
This discussion of NOAH and Muhammad demonstrates several points.
First, under NOAH, a man with socially unpopular religious attitudes, one
who condones the subjugation of women, could potentially receive custody.
If he were a better caregiver, however, and if his unpopular religious prac-
tices did not actually harm the child, this would be the correct result. Sec-
ond, the Muhammad trial court could have addressed most of the potentially
objectionable behaviors during the initial phase of the NOAH procedure,
thus preventing the infusion of the chancellor's religious bias. This analysis
of harmful behaviors involves nothing new for actual harm courts. The
NOAH analysis simply occurs after the initial custody determination, to en-
sure that religious bias does not cloud the pure determination of caregiving
skills, and mandates a finding of fact to justify a modification.
Admittedly, the NOAH procedure has its limitations. A court sharing the
religious views of Mr. Muhammad would be unlikely to find actual harm
resulting from the practices in question. Harm, particularly psychological
harm, is likely to be viewed through a lens tinted by the jurist's religious
views. By limiting the opportunity for the exercise of discretion to a bifur-
cated proceeding and requiring actual harm, however, NOAH minimizes the
opportunity for the exercise of religious bias while still protecting children
from actual harm.
B. Child Abuse and Medical Cases
Cases that either contain proven allegations of child abuse or concern a
parent's withholding of medical treatment from the children comprise a sec-
ond subset of cases. In these cases, one parent typically complains of relig-
ious discrimination or asserts a free exercise right to support either their cor-
poral punishment of their children or their decision to refuse the children
needed medical care.
Courts at present appropriately conclude that the First Amendment does
not sanction child abuse.213 Peterson v. Peterson214 provides an example of a
213. These cases present less difficulty to the courts because actual harm is usually clear and
often the claimed religion does not require corporal punishment. See, e.g., Jakab v. Jakab, 664 A.2d
261, 265 (Vt. 1995) (finding that the record did not show that being a Jehovah's Witness required
the father to physically discipline his children by beating them); Vamum v. Varnum, 586 A.2d
1107, 1112 (Vt. 1990) (affirming that the lower court's custody decision was based primarily on the
mother's abuse, which went beyond what her Jehovah's Witness religion required). Of course,
courts are not always so consistent in considering the danger of physical harm. See, e.g., Leppert v.
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court's use of the substantial threat test in a case involving abusive behavior.
Robert Peterson filed for a modification of a decree that.had granted custody
to the mother, Carol Peterson. The record showed that Carol had given one
child over 40 lashings with a leather belt.21 5 The trial court granted the
modification, giving custody to Robert. It enjoined Carol from physically
punishing the children and from speaking to them at all about her religion
under penalty of contempt.216
The appellate court found that Carol's proven abusive behavior consti-
tuted a material change of circumstances and affirmed the modification or-
der. It concluded that: (1) "excessive use of corporal punishment poses an
immediate and substantial threat" of harm to the children;217 and (2) the trial
court abused its discretion in finding that Carol's religious beliefs, rather
than her practices, undermined her ability to perform parenting functions.218
Instead of prohibiting Carol from speaking about her religion, the appellate
court enjoined her from contradicting, disparaging or questioning the validity
of the father's religion.219
The Peterson modification case illustrates how the NOAH test could
work in the child abuse fact pattern. During the initial phase of the modifi-
cation proceeding, Robert would present evidence of the beatings. If Carol
retained custody, the inquiry would end without mention of Carol's religion.
If, however, the court transferred custody to Robert, it could obviate the need
for a phase two analysis by finding that the beatings harmed the children.
Then, Carol would have no reason to pursue the matter. Because the beat-
ings would have already been found harmful, she could anticipate the futility
of arguing that her religion compels corporal punishment.
If, during the initial phase, the court transferred custody to Robert but
failed to label the beatings as actually harmful, Carol might pursue a phase
two analysis. She would argue that her religion mandated the use of corpo-
real punishment. Upon a finding of actual harm to the children, the court
could justify its transfer of custody to Robert and narrowly tailor any restric-
tions on Carol, as was actually done. Alternately, under NOAH the court
might determine that Carol was the more appropriate parent, but for the
physical abuse, and leave Carol with custody with the restriction that she not
physically discipline the children. Such an order, leaving custody with a
Leppert, 519 N.W.2d 287, 289-90 (N.D. 1994) (reversing a custody award to transfer children to
their father, citing the "extreme danger to the children, both physically and emotionally" resulting
from the mother's beliefs, but noting the lack of actual abuse).
214. 474 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 1991).
215. See id. at 865-66.
216. See id. at 872.
217. Id. at 869-70.
218. See id.
219. See id. at 872.
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parent who previously beat her children, might be unpopular. But if the
court could ensure that Carol would desist from corporal punishment, and if
it determined that Carol was the preferred custodian otherwise, such an ar-
rangement might serve the best interests of the children.
Of course, Carol's proven abusive behavior in the Petersen case left no
room for speculation and facilitated the court's decision. One can envision a
scenario, however, in which a parent states an intent to engage in a practice
that others might find abusive, but which, standing alone, does not threaten
physical harm. Does the NOAH standard, with its actual harm requirement,
still safeguard a child? The problem of safeguarding children in the custody
of a parent who might refuse needed medical care provides a useful vehicle
for exploring this question.
In Garrett v. Garrett,220 the court applied the substantial threat test where
the mother, a Jehovah's Witness, admitted that she would refuse to permit
any of her children to receive a blood transfusion. 2 1 The appellate court af-
firmed the custody award to the mother, and concluded that the father's ob-
jection, based solely on the mother's religion, must fail because the "record
is devoid of any expert testimony that Jeanne's religious practices are immi-
nently harmful to the children. '222
In response to the blood transfusion testimony, the appellate court held
that:
[N]o evidence was presented showing that any of the minor children were prone
to accidents or were plagued with any sort of affliction that might necessitate a
blood transfusion in the near future. We cannot decide this case based on some
hypothetical future accident or illness which might necessitate such treatment.
Facts such as the statistical frequency of blood transfusions for normal children
and the degree of risk involved in taking or refusing blood or chemical substi-
tutes must be proved by proper evidence, like any other facts. 223
Courts applying the actual harm standard have also found that speculation
about the need for medical attention did not justify the denial of custody.224
Application of the NOAH standard would lead to the same result, while
providing greater procedural safeguards. Absent evidence that religious be-
liefs regarding medical treatment would inevitably harm a child, a parent
could not be denied custody. Perhaps in phase two, however, the NOAH
court would consider restricting the custodial parent such that if the need for
emergency medical decisions arose, and if the harm of a religious/medical
220. 527 N.W.2d 213 (Neb. Ct. App. 1995).
221. See id. 220-21.
222. Id. at 221; see also In re Marriage of Wang, 896 P.2d 450,450-51 (Mont. 1995) (holding
that lack of findings on father's unconventional religion does not defeat custodial award to him).
223. Garrett, 527 N.W.2d at 221 (citations omitted).
224. See, e.g., note 133 supra.
1654 [Vol. 50:1609
FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILDREN
belief becomes a certainty, the noncustodial parent would gain the right to
make those decisions.2 25
Faced with a child with a serious medical condition, a NOAH judge
might rule that a parent with religious beliefs that prohibit medical treatment
cannot adequately care for a child. This ruling would amount to a finding of
actual harm. Moreover, a NOAH court would not need to delve into the par-
ent's religious beliefs to deal with this situation. Once apprised of the child's
medical needs in the first phase of the court proceeding, the court could pose
the question, "Will you arrange for the child to receive medical care?" A
negative answer from a potential custodian would disqualify the parent with-
out necessitating an investigation into the parent's beliefs.
The losing parent might request a phase two analysis of her free exercise
rights. The judge would then make detailed findings of fact, supported by
evidence, that the parent's religious proscriptions regarding medical care
would harm the child. Obviously, the NOAH procedure will often produce
the same results as the current system. The NOAH procedure ensures
against religious bias corrupting the system. It may also result in fewer First
Amendment appeals. Thus, the NOAH standard can safeguard the children
and their medical needs while still protecting parental constitutional rights,
and avoiding the appearance of disapproval of religious beliefs and practices.
C. Religious Training and Visitation Restriction Cases226
For most cases in which parents have differing religious views, religious
training becomes an issue. In over 70% of the surveyed cases, parents ar-
gued about religious training and education. In many of these cases, one
parent argued that mixed religious training or exposure to conflicting relig-
ious views either harmed or posed a substantial threat of harm to the chil-
dren. Unlike the child abuse and medical treatment cases in which harm was
proven, the cases dealing with religious training or visitation are more like
the "relevant issue" cases in that the alleged harm is arguable. These cases
therefore highlight the differences between NOAH and conventional analy-
sis, providing a good test of the efficacy of the NOAH procedure.
Many courts have addressed the advisability of exposing children to
multiple religions. Some find mixed exposure harmful to children. 227 Others
225. A written custody order would ensure compliance and would provide the noncustodial
parent with documentation for health care providers. Obviously, the custodial parent could avoid
this provision in a variety of ways. If the court suspected religious zeal might prompt non-
compliance, the court could decline to order such an arrangement. See, e.g., Lange v. Lange, 502
N.W.2d 143, 145 (Vis. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to fashion special orders, the court reasoned, "The
respondent indicates he intends to follow God's order, not the court's.").
226. I place these issues together because deciding the child's religious training almost always
includes a related restriction on one parent's custodial time allotment.
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do not presume that harm will result from mixed training.22 8 The Zummo
case, discussed earlier,229 centered on the parents' disagreement concerning
the children's religious training. The Zummo court rejected Pamela and
David's "contract" concerning that training230 and dismissed the notion that a
mixed religious environment was necessarily detrimental to children.231 The
court explained that "the speculative possibility of mere disquietude, disori-
entation, or confusion arising from exposure to 'contradictory' religions
would be a patently insufficient 'emotional harm' to justify encroachment by
the government upon constitutional parental and religious rights of parents,
even in the context of divorce. 12 32 The Zummo court continued:
It is well established that high levels of parental conflict before or after divorce
are a significant factor in the distress experienced by children of divorce, re-
gardless of the source or topic of the conflict. Thus, acrimonious disputes, or
situations in which one parent uses religion as a tool to poison his or her chil-
dren with disrespect for or animosity toward the other parent might present a
compelling case for intervention between two Jews or two Christians of similar
sects, while a respectful but irreconcilable dispute between and Christian and a
Jew would not.
233
The Zummo court also rejected the idea it had a duty to preserve relig-
ious stability in the child's life:
[T]he prohibition on preferring some religion to none, may not be avoided by
suggesting that religion or religious stability is only being considered because
of the secular rather than spiritual benefits expected to arise from protecting the
stability of a child's religious beliefs .... The exclusion of the benefits of sta-
227. See, e.g., LeDoux v. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1990) (affirming trial court's de-
termination that mixed religious training would negatively affect the children's well-being); Lange,
502 N.W.2d at 145 (quoting lower court's finding that children were "confused by the different
religious teachings of the parties").
228. See, e.g., Zunmno v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1154-57 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (discussing
mixed religious training and concluding that it was not generally harmful to children); In re Mar-
riage of Weiss, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 339, 345 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509 (1996) (presuming
no harm from mixed religious training).
229. See text accompanying notes 137-152 supra.
230. See Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1143-48.
231. See id. at 1154-57; see also In re Marriage of Moore 526 N.W.2d 335, 337-38 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1994) (denying the father's request for a change of custody based on the claim that the relig-
ious- training his children received with their mother alienated them from him).
232. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1155. For the opposing view, see Kirchner v. Caughey, 606 A.2d
257 (Md. 1992) (remanding to consider limiting noncustodial parent's religious training of child, in
view of expert testimony regarding child's stress arising from conflicting training); Lebovich v.
Wilson, 547 N.Y.S.2d 54 (App. Div. 1989) (evidence of actual, harmful stress on child caused by
religious training conflict warranted curtailing her participation in her father's religion).
233. Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1156 (citations omitted); see also In re Marriage of Weiss, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 339, 345 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 509 (1996) (agreeing with Zummo explicitly
that the harm to a child arising from conflicting training is more a result of parents' conduct than of
theological difference); McCown v. McCown, 649 A.2d 418, 421, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(noting that differing religions do not impose unique harms independent of usual distress resulting
from parents' divorce); note 136 supra.
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bility in religious inculcation and of religiosity in general are apparently part of
the price which must be paid for religious freedom and constitutional recogni-
tion of parental rights.
234
These passages reflect the court's commitment to avoiding the advancement
of one religion or religion generally.
In contrast to Zummo stands LeDoux v. LeDoux.235 Edward LeDoux, a
Jehovah's Witness, appealed a dissolution decree ordering him to refrain
from exposing his children, including his son Andrew, to any religious prac-
tices or teachings inconsistent with Catholicism, the religion of his wife Di-
ane.236 The Supreme Court of Rhode Island ruled that the trial court had not
abused its discretion since Edward's practices were negatively impacting the
children. The supreme court determined, "There is ample evidence to con-
clude that the stress Andrew was experiencing posed an immediate and sub-
stantial threat to his well-being. 237
The evidence relied upon by the supreme court included Diane's testi-
mony concerning her fights with Edward over their religious differences, his
refusal to celebrate holidays, and his general hostility to Catholicism. A psy-
chologist called by Diane testified that conflicts between the parents' relig-
ions contributed to Andrew's stress.238 Citing Prince, the supreme court jus-
tified its decision to restrict Edward on the grounds that free exercise "does
not include liberty to expose ... the child to ... ill health. . ".. -239 The su-
preme court also acknowledged Diane's right as the custodial parent to con-
trol the child's formal religious indoctrination. 240
Justice Shanahan wrote a strong dissent. He proposed that noncustodial
parents should not be blocked from exposing their children to their religious
234. Zununo, 574 A.2d at 1151-52; see also Boylan v. Boylan, 577 A.2d 218 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1990), overruled on other grounds by G.B. v. M.M.B. 670 A.2d 714 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (rejecting
appeal by father who claimed to have same religion as children but affirming that courts should
consider parental religion in custody cases). But see Edwards v. Edwards, 829 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992) (using best interests test to support custody award to father when mother proved
religiously unstable).
235. 452 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1990).
236. See id. at 2. The court deemed its restriction narrowly tailored because it enjoined Ed-
ward from discussing only those aspects of the Jehovah's Witness faith that conflicted with his ex-
wife's religion. See id. at 5.
237. Id. at 5. But see Zuno, 574 A.2d at 1151-52 (deferring the issue of a child's religion to
the parents).
238. See LeDou:, 452 N.W.2d at 3-4.
239. Id. at 486 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)). In contrast to
many of the surveyed child custody cases, the LeDoux court referred frequently to U.S. Supreme
Court precedent.
240. See LeDouxy, 452 N.W.2d at 5. LeDoux was not a modification case. The trial court had
just chosen Diane as the custodial parent and then used that appointment to give her control of the
children's formal religious training, which is standard practice in Nebraska. See also note 163 su-
pra; cf. Burrows v. Brady, 605 A.2d 1312, 1316 (R.I. 1992) (holding that when parents have joint
custody, both parents have an equal right to influence the religious beliefs of their children).
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beliefs absent a clear showing that their beliefs would harm the child,241 and
then cautioned that a court should not assume or surmise harm.242 Addition-
ally, he noted that the law "tolerates and even encourages up to a point the
child's exposure to the religious influences of both parents although they are
divided in their faiths. '243 Justice Shanahan provided an exhaustive review
of the "evidence" that motivated the majority opinion. The record revealed
that Diane had harbored significant hostilities toward Edward's faith and that
she had conveyed those hostilities to Andrew, telling him that Jehovah's
Witnesses "would mess up his [Andrew's] mind just like they messed up the
mind of his father."244 Furthermore, the psychologist testified "that with the
cooperation of parents, a child might be introduced to two different religions
in a manner which would not be stressful." 245 Based on his review, Justice
Shanahan could not conclude that Edward's religious practices would be
harmful to the child.246
Justice Shanahan also expressed regret over the majority's extensive re-
striction of the father's expression of his religious views. The Justice won-
dered how the father could resolve the "countless quodlibets concerning the
dichotomy of dogma between Jehovah's Witnesses and Catholicism '' 47
without violating the order. He added that the order "casts a judge in the role
of a theological umpire. 2 48
The LeDoux case exemplifies Zummo's admonition that "situations in
which one parent uses religion as a tool to poison his or her children with
241. See LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d at 7 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
242. See id. at 7-8.
243. Id. at 8 (quoting Felton v. Felton, 418 N.E.2d 606, 607-08 (Mass. 1981)).
244. Id. at 8 (quoting the record). Cf Bienenfeld v. Bennett-White, 605 A.2d 172, 182 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1992) (affirming change of custody to father, reasoning that when the mother's re-
ligious views pose a threat to the children's relationship to their father, her views impact the chil-
dren's emotional well-being).
245. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d at 10 (Shanahan, J., dissenting).
246. See id; cf In re Marriage of Jensen-Branch, 899 P.2d 803, 805 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995)
(noting that the issue of religious decisionmaking merited further evaluation). Jensen-Branch illus-
trates the need for clear and convincing evidence of harm caused by religion. In this case, the non-
custodial father appealed restrictions that enjoined him from giving his children religious education
in the Worldwide Church of God. It affirmed that a trial court could consider the parents' religious
affiliations but noted that "there must be a substantial showing of actual or potential harm to the
children from exposure to the parents' conflicting religious beliefs." Id. at 808. The court added:
Thus, findings of actual or potential harm must be made with reference to specific evidence
and the specific needs of the children involved, as opposed to general findings of harm which
leave an appellate court searching the record for evidence that may or may not have been seen
as pivotal or relevant by the trial court.
Id. at 808-09. The court concluded that insufficient evidence supported the trial court's ruling and
remanded the case for further proceedings. But see note 222 supra.
247. LeDoux, 452 N.W.2d at 11.
248. Id.
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disrespect for or animosity toward the other parent might present a compel-
ling case for intervention. 249
Just two months after LeDoux, Justice Shanahan wrote the majority
opinion in Von Tersch v. Von Tersch.250 Geri Von Tersch, the custodial parent,
appealed a custody order that required her to remove her children from re-
ligious school and enroll them in public school. Geri argued that the order
unreasonably interfered with her First Amendment rights to freedom of re-
ligion and to direct the upbringing of her children. 251
The Von Tersch trial court conducted a substantial threat analysis and
held that, based upon the court-appointed psychologist's testimony, the chil-
dren should attend public school. In reversing the lower court, the Nebraska
Supreme Court noted that no other evidence supported the idea that a relig-
ious school might harm the children.2 52 It concluded that "the trial court
abused its discretion by intruding upon the right of a custodial parent to de-
termine the nature and extent of educating a child .... ,,253
The Von Tersch case reveals several ways in which a court can misapply
the substantial threat test. First, the trial court misinterpreted the children's
lost opportunities for social interaction and athletic competition as a substan-
tial threat of harm35 4 Second, the trial court erred by effectively substituting
the substantial threat test with the best interests of the child standard when it
determined that the public school would offer the children more opportunity
for social interaction and competition. 255
249. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (citations omitted); see
also Burrows v. Brady, 605 A.2d 1312, 1317-18 (R-I. 1992) ("religious training may provide a
means to seek revenge and to limit a parent's visitation privileges.... In these cases it is the chil-
dren who ultimately suffer."); note 233 supra.
250. 455 N.W.2d 130 (Neb. 1990).
251. See id. at 134.
252. See id. at 136.
253. Id; cf. In re Marriage of Debenham, 896 P.2d 1098 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming the
trial court's denial of a request to modify a joint custody order to deny enrollment at a private re-
ligious school while noting the possibility of subsequent litigation on the same issue); McCown v.
McCown, 649 A.2d 418 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (affirming rejection of an amendment to a
divorce decree sought to enable the mother to send her children to Hebrew, rather than secular,
school).
254. See Von Tersch, 455 N.W.2d at 136; see also Doolittle v. Doolittle, 525 N.W.2d 245,
248 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) (finding no substantial threat of harm to children when Mennonite custo-
dial mother kept children home from school after eighth grade). But see Gardini v. Moyer, 575
N.E.2d 423, 427 (Ohio 1991) (affining that custodial mother substantially endangered children by
removing them from elementary school).
255. See Von Tersch, 455 N.W.2d at 136. But see Burrows v. Brady, 605 A.2d 1312 (R.I.
1992) (applying best interests test to reject an appeal of an order giving the father custody of his
children on Sunday, precluding the mother from including the children in her church services).
Comparing the Von Tersch and Burrows cases demonstrates how courts manipulate the definition of
"restriction" to increase their discretion in choosing which standards to apply.
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
The Von Tersch decision also demonstrates that courts must scrutinize
experts' opinions closely. For example, the Von Tersch trial court largely
relied on a psychologist's hypothesis in making its finding of harm.256
Courts must recognize that experts may also harbor personal biases toward
minority religions or may employ standards for psychological evaluations
that differ from the substantial threat, actual harm, best interests, and least
restrictive means tests.257
Applying the NOAH procedure in these cases would lead to similar re-
sults but would better address the free exercise claims and reduce the appear-
ance of bias. For example, a court applying the NOAH procedure to the
Zummo facts would exclude all discussion of religious training until after it
had made an initial custody determination. Then, finding no harm from a
mixed religious upbringing, the court would allow both parents to share their
religious views with the children.
A court applying the NOAH approach to the LeDoux facts would likely
arrive at the same custody decision but would not base it on the parents' re-
ligious practices. The couple's inability to cooperate would likely lead to a
custody award to the mother, but a court could not restrict the father's relig-
ious influence without first finding that this influence harmed the children
and that such limitations were the least restrictive alternative. Substantiated
by proffered evidence, such an explicit finding would reduce the appearance
of bias. On the other hand, a NOAH court might determine that the son's
psychological "stress" alone did not constitute harm. A court might instead
enjoin each parent from disparaging the other's faith to the children.258
The Von Tersch decision demonstrates another advantage of the NOAH
approach. A first phase NOAH analysis might find that the religious school
provided an inferior educational environment compared to the local public
school. The second phase analysis enables the mother to raise her free exer-
cise and custodial rights arguments to send the children to an academically
adequate religious school. Under NOAH, the court must accept a mother's
choice of academic institutions unless it finds that her choice actually harms
256. See Von Tersch, 455 N.W.2d at 136.
257. See text accompanying notes 158, 238, 244-245 supra. See, e.g., Varnum v. Vamum,
586 A.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Vt. 1990). Varnum affirmed the denial of custody to an abusive mother
who was a Jehovah's Witness, relying, in part, on a psychologist's finding that the father "had 'a
better attitude and concept of what children need to be raised in a normal fashion."' Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting the psychologist's evaluation). This reference to "normality" raises the concern
that the psychologist considered Jehovah's Witnesses abnormal. See also Palmer v. Palmer, 545
N.W.2d 751 (Neb. 1996) (applying the Von Tersch substantial threat test to reverse a trial court
order based largely on a guardian ad litem's testimony which limited the extent to which a custodial
mother who is a Jehovah's Witness may involve her child in her religious activities).
258. See Peterson v. Peterson, 474 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Neb. 1991) (reversing the portion of the
trial court's order prohibiting the mother from discussing religion with her children, but ordering
mother to abstain from disparaging the father's religion).
1660 [Vol. 50:1609
May 1998] FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILDREN 1661
the children. The Von Tersch trial court's finding of harm and the appellate
reversal of that finding highlight the fact that evaluations can differ. None-
theless, the NOAH approach facilitates appellate review by requiring trial
courts to make explicit findings from adduced evidence regarding actual
harm to children. As applied to Von Tersch, this requirement would clarify
the appellate court's grounds for reversal, if not change the original ruling.
The father's right to share his religious beliefs with his children would re-
main unaffected. He simply could not frustrate the custodial mother's choice
of school, absent a finding of harm.
D. Relocation Cases
In our mobile society, dissolution and modification cases often focus on
the intended relocation of one parent2 9 Sometimes, the party opposing the
move exaggerates religious differences or the potential harm of religious
practices in order to defeat the award of custody to the relocating parent or to
secure a custody change, preventing the child from relocating.260 If the par-
ent desiring to move belongs to a minority religion (or is not religious), the
opposing parent may also gain a tactical advantage by exploiting religious
prejudice.261 As a matter of policy, should courts consider religion when
scrutinizing geographic relocations? 262
259. See, e.g., Larson v. Larson, 888 P.2d 719 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (reversing a transfer of
custody from the mother to the father because she intended to move out of state with the children
and would be less likely to continue their religious training in the Mormon faith). The Larson court
adhered to a standard of review that deferred to custodial control over child rearing, noting that "the
compatibility of a parent's and child's religious beliefs is not a matter that the court should consider,
absent some showing that religious beliefs are translated into actions that are harmful to a child's
welfare." Id. at 724.
260. See Kammerer v. Martin, No. 95-0665, 1995 WL 723249 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1995)
(upholding grant of primary custody to father when mother announced plan to move and finding no
First Amendment violation where the order restricts her right to interrupt school for religious
events); see also Gancas v. Schultz, 683 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (reversing a custody
award to father when mother decided to move away, in part because trial court failed to give suffi-
cient weight to the mother's interest in the continued religious training of the children); Ridge v.
Ridge, No. 0117-92-4, 1993 WL 40963 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1993) (affirming a trial court finding
that, contrary to the mother's allegations, the father's religious practices did not injure the children
and therefore would not prevent his moving away with them); Jennifer Ann Drobac, Demonized
Women: Accused Witches in Recent Child Custody Cases (Apr. 4, 1997), <http://www-
leland.stanford.edu/classlaw495/drobac.htm> (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (noting that
divorce litigants may exploit religious differences to prevent a custodial parent's moving away).
261. Very similar situations occur when a party desires to remarry---especially if the remar-
riage involves a conversion to the new spouse's faith.
262. Relocation cases also implicate the constitutional right to interstate travel first recog-
nized in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (6 wall.) (1867) (the right to interstate travel is a necessary
inference from the structure of the Constitution and the federal government); see also United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966) ("freedom to travel throughout the United States has long been
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution."). A discussion of the right to travel, as it relates
to child custody cases, is beyond the scope of this note. However, the constitutional right to travel
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
In Osteraas v. Osteraas,263 the Idaho Supreme Court dealt with blatant
religious discrimination in remarriage and relocation. In Osteraas, the father
moved for a change of custody when he learned that the mother intended to
remarry and move out of state with the children. The trial court granted the
custody change, finding that "the father would provide more stability and
superior moral training," based on "the religion factor."264  The supreme
court reversed, concluding that "the trial court abused its discretion in re-
moving primary ... custody from the mother based in part on that court's
perception of her lack of religiousness. '265 The supreme court held that the
trial court's ruling implicated both the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses because when courts make custody contingent upon religious faith,
they force parents to choose between their beliefs and their children.266
The Osteraas court employed language from both the Lemon and en-
dorsement tests in finding an Establishment Clause violation, although it did
not specifically name the endorsement test. The supreme court wrote:
The other effect of utilizing the religion factor in deciding custody disputes
is that the courts will be seen as appearing to favor one religion over another, or
favor religion in general as against no declared religion, thus using this factor
would serve to establish such religion in contravention of the First Amendment
establishment clause because it would have the primary effect of advancing re-
ligion, thus violating the second prong of the Lemon test.26 7
This passage demonstrates that the Osteraas court intended to avoid the ap-
pearance of endorsing or advancing any religion.
In relocation cases like Osteraas, an application of the NOAH procedure
would prevent any discussion of a mother's lack of religious affiliations in
the first phase. Presumably, the custodial parent would obtain permission to
relocate and the other parent would be denied custody. The noncustodial
parent could raise religion in the second phase. However, having to prove
actual harm to the children based on the other parent's religious practices
might discourage such an attempt.
complicates these relocation cases and should drive courts to be all the more diligent in examining
the constitutional implications of custody cases involving relocation and religion.
263. 859 P.2d 948 (Idaho 1993).
264. Id. at 950 (quoting the trial court) (footnote omitted).
265. Id. at 954.
266. See id. at 952 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
267. Id. at 953 (footnote omitted) (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586-88 (1992) and
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)) (noting that Lemon has not been overruled).
1662 [Vol. 50:1609
FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILDREN
CONCLUSION
Clarence Darrow declared, "The realm of religion ... is where knowl-
edge leaves off, and where faith begins, and it never has needed the arm of
the State for support, and wherever it has received it, it has harmed both the
public and the religion that it would pretend to serve. '268
Court consideration of religion in child custody cases currently harms
more families than it benefits. The NOAH procedure would enable family
law courts to consider religion only when absolutely required to serve a
child's best interests or to protect against First Amendment violations. The
NOAH bifurcated system would help to prevent religious bias from corrupt-
ing the initial custody determination. When evidence of parenting skills, and
not religious bias, informs the custody decision, the child's best interests are
served. Application of the NOAH procedure would encourage court ac-
knowledgement of First Amendment rights, those stemming not only from
the Free Exercise Clause but also from the Establishment Clause. Imple-
mentation might also reduce the number of appeals based on alleged First
Amendment violations.
The NOAH procedure incorporates the actual harm standard currently
employed in many states. This standard, if implemented in the bifurcated
proceeding, would provide courts with an effective "negative rule" and guid-
ance on when they can disqualify parents as custodians on the basis of their
religious practices. This standard would foster compliance not only with the
First Amendment but also with the Equal Protection Clause. Implementation
of the NOAH procedure may help standardize custody determinations with-
out overly compromising the court's discretionary function in determining
the child's best interests. Standardization contributes to predictability in de-
cisionmaking and may foster early dispute resolution. Thus, the need for the
NOAH procedure is critical, not only to protect parents' religious rights, but
also to protect children, their safety, and their relationships with both of their
parents.
For thousands of years, persecution and intolerance have plagued those
with religious beliefs. At the dawn of the new millennium, we must ensure
that the next thousand years does not repeat such intolerance. The First
Amendment is our beacon in this quest for religious liberty. We must adhere
to its dictates in child custody cases, for the sake of the children, if for no one
else.
268. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Tr. of




Case / Religious State / Citation Standard(s) Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
Kendall v. Kendall / MA / 687 N.E.2d actual substantial cites to U.S.
religious training, 1228 (Mass. 1997), harm / clear Supreme Court
father is petition for cert. evidence required cases but doubts
fundamentalist filed, 66 U.S.L.W. continuing vitality
Christian 3422 (U.S. Apr. 27, of Lemon
1998) (No. 97-
1756)
In re Marriage of CA / 49 Cal. Rptr. clear and cites to U.S.
Weiss / contract to 2d 339 (Ct. App.), affirmative / actual Supreme Court
raise child Jewish, cert. denied, 117 S. harm / both parents cases
visitation Ct. 509 (1996) can teach religion
restrictions
Abbo v. Briskin / FL / 660 So. 2d no consideration /
religious training, 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. both parents can
raise child Jewish App. 1995) teach religion
Jakab v. Jakab / VT / 664 A.2d 261 actual harm / physical abuse
father is Jehovah's (Vt. 1995) custodian controls
Witness
Tsolumba v. OH / No. 16872, will harm / actual cooperation
Tsolumba / mother 1995 WL 366378 harm / can restrict emphasized
is member of (Ohio Ct. App. June noncustodial parent
minority religion 21, 1995)
Gago v. Acevedo / NY / 625 N.Y.S.2d actual harm found Relevant Issue
mother is Jehovah's 250 (App. Div. but citation to case? / false
Witness 1995) Aldous v. Aldous accusation of child




Sotnick v. Sotnick / FL / 650 So. 2d 157 no consideration I
contract to raise (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. both parents can
child Jewish 1995) teach religion / can
restrict noncustodial
parent
Leppert v. Leppert / ND / 519 N.W.2d clear and
mother is member 287 (N.D. 1994) affirmative / actual
of minority religion harm
deLevie v. deLevie / OH / 621 N.E.2d custodian controls
school, both parents 594 (Ohio Ct.
Jewish-mother is App.),jurisdictional
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TABLE I (CONT.)
ACTUAL HARM CASES
Case / Religious State / Citation Standard(s) Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
Marjorie G. v. NY / 592 N.Y.S.2d will harm / restrictions imposed
Stephen G. / school, 209 (Sup. Ct. 1992) custodian controls I




Pater v. Pater I OH / 588 N.E.2d will harm / actual cites U.S. Supreme
mother is Jehovah's 794 (Ohio 1992) harm / can restrict Court cases
Witness noncustodial parent
In re Marriage of IA /462 N.W.2d no consideration / joint custody
Craig / religious 692 (Iowa Ct. App. both parents can
training 1990) teach
Varmum v. VT / 586 A.2d 1107 actual harm / least physical abuse
Vamum / mother is (Vt. 1990) restrictive means
Jehovah's Witness I I I
STANFORD LA WREVIEW
TABLE II
ACTUAL HARM / MODIFICATIONS
Case / Religious State / Citation Standards Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
Larson v. Larson / UT / 888 P.2d 719 consistency /
relocation, religious (Utah Ct. App. stability
training 1994)
McCown v. NJ / 649 A.2d 418 no consideration /
McCown / school, (N.J. Super. Ct. both parents can
mother is Jewish App. Div. 1994) teach religion
In re Marriage of IA / 526 N.W.2d no consideration / no material and
Moore / religious 335 (Iowa Ct. App. both parents can substantial change
training 1994) teach religion
Hoefers v. Jones / NJ / 672 A.2d 1299 no religion issue breach ofjoint
who must pay for (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. custody agreement
school Div. 1994), aff'd regarding school
per curiam, 672
A.2d 1177 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div.
1996)
De Luca v. NY / 609 N.Y.S.2d actual harm /
De Luca / mother is 80 (App. Div. 1994) custodian controls /
Jehovah's Witness both parents can
teach religion
Stafford v. OH / No. L-93-026, will harm / actual
Stafford / visitation, 1994 WL 30515 harm
father is Mormon (Ohio Ct. App. Feb.
4, 1994)
Osteraas v. ID / 859 P.2d 948 clear and cites U.S. Supreme
Osteraas / mother is (Idaho 1993) affirmative / actual Court cases
not religious harm / consistency /
stability
Kirchner v. MD / 606 A.2d 257 actual harm /
Caughey / religious (Md. 1992) conflates different
training, father is standards (risk,
Baptist substantial threat,
etc.) / clear and
affirmative
Lebovich v. NY / 547 N.Y.S.2d actual harm very short opinion
Wilson / visitation 54 (App. Div. 1989) with few details
restrictions
[Vol. 50:16091666
FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILDREN
TABLE III
SUBSTANTIAL THREAT CASES
Case / Religious State / Citation Standards Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
Reid v. Girouard / NE / No. A-95- Immediate and cites to U.S.
restrictions 1144, 1996 WL substantial / Supreme Court
380685 (Neb. Ct. custodian controls cases
App. July 9, 1996)
Palmer v. Palmer / NE / 545 N.W.2d immediate and cites to U.S.
mother is Jehovah's 751 (Neb. 1996) substantial / Supreme Court
Witness custodian controls / cases
both parents can
teach religion
In re Marriage of WA / 899 P.2d 803 immediate and
Jensen-Branch / (Wash. Ct. App. substantial / both
religious training 1995) parents can teach
restrictions, father is religion
member of minority
religion
In re Marriage of MT / 896 P.2d 450 health would be
Wang / father is (Mont. 1995) endangered I
member of minority emotional
religion development
impaired
Garrett v. Garrett / NE / 527 N.W.2d immediate and cites to U.S.
mother is Jehovah's 213 (Neb. Ct. App. substantial / least Supreme Court
Witness 1995) restrictive cases
alternative
In re Marriage of CO / 847 P.2d 251 health would be paternal
Oswald / religious (Colo. Ct. App. endangered / grandmother sued
training 1993) emotional for visitation so she
development could take child to
impaired church
Zummo v. Zummo / PA / 574 A.2d 1130 immediate and exhaustive analysis
contract to raise (Pa. Super. Ct. substantial / both of multitude of
child Jewish, 1990) parents can teach issues, cites to U.S.
discrimination, religion / least Supreme Court
visitation restrictive cases
restrictions alternative
Von Tersch v. Von NE / 455 N.W.2d immediate and cites to U.S.
Tersch / school 130 (Neb. 1990) substantial Supreme Court
cases
LeDoux v. NE / 452 N.W.2d 1 immediate and lengthy dissent:
LeDoux / father is (Neb. 1990) substantial / clear and
Jehovah's Witness custodian controls I affirmative / actual
can restrict harm / both parents
noncustodial can teach religion,






SUBSTANTIAL THREAT CASES / MODIFICATIONS
Case / Religious State / Citation Standards Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
Doolittle v. NE / 525 N.W.2d immediate and cites to U.S.
Doolittle / school, 245 (Neb. Ct. App. substantial / Supreme Court
mother is 1994) custodian controls cases
Mennonite
Johnson v. Nation / IN / 615 N.E.2d 141 health would be required
father is Evangelist (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) endangered / substantially
emotional changed
development circumstances,
impaired / custodian cooperation
controls emphasized
Bienenfeld v. MD / 605 A.2d 172 immediate and cites to U.S.
Bennett-White / (Md. Ct. Spec. App. substantial / both Supreme Court
religious training 1992) can teach religion cases
Burrows v. Brady I RI / 605 A.2d 1312 immediate and cites Lemon
visitation (R.I. 1992) substantial / both
restrictions can teach religion
Peterson v. NE / 474 N.W.2d immediate and physical abuse
Peterson / school, 862 (Neb. 1991) substantial / least
mother is member restrictive means
of minority religion
Gardini v. Moyer / OH / 575 N.E.2d immediate and
home school 423 (Ohio 1991) substantial
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TABLE V
RISK CASES
Case / Religious State / Citation Standards Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
Murphy v. Murphy I MN / No. CO-95- likely to endanger physical abuse
father is member of 1363, 1996 WL
minority religion 70978 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 20,1996)
Petersen v. Rogers / NC / 433 S.E.2d may adversely
parents are 770 (N.C. Ct. App. affect
members of 1993), rev'd on
minority religion other grounds, 445
S.E.2d 901 (N.C.
1994)
In re Marriage of MT / 779 P.2d 883 may interfere with
Gersovitz / religious (Mont. 1989) general welfare
training
TABLE VI
RISK CASES / MODIFICATIONS
Case / Religious State / Citation Standards Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
MacLagan v. NC / 473 S.E.2d May adversely unmarried, joint
Klein / religious 778 (N.C. Ct. App. affect custody, but father
training 1996), review obtains sole right
denied by 483 regarding religious
S.E.2d 170 (N.C. training
1997)
Stolarick v. Novak / PA / 584 A.2d 1034 consider detrimental







Case / Religious State / Citation Standards Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
Gancas v. Schultz / PA / 683 A.2d 1207 consider spiritual
religious training (Pa. Super. Ct. welfare of child,
1996) religion as one
factor
In re Marriage of KN / 896 P.2d 1098 consider stability
Debenham / school (Kan. Ct. App.
1995)
Alaniz v. Alaniz / TX / 867 S.W.2d 54 consider if harmful, beliefs and practices
mother is Jehovah's (Tex. Ct. App. illegal, immoral reviewed
Witness 1993)
Muhammad v. MI / 622 So. 2d immoral cites to U.S.
Muhammad / father 1239 (Miss. 1993) Supreme Court
is member of cases
minority religion
Lange v. Lange / WI / 502 N.W.2d no test / custodian cites to U.S.
father is member of 143 (Wis. Ct. App. controls / can Supreme Court
minority religion 1993) restrict noncustodial cases
parent
Ridge v. Ridge / VA / No. 0117-92- religion as one
relocation, mother 4, 1993 WL 40963 factor
accuses father of (Va. Ct. App. Jan.
religious fanaticism 26, 1993)
Edwards v. MO / 829 S.W.2d best interests stability
Edwards / mother 91 (Mo. Ct. App.
unstable in religious 1992)
beliefs
In re Marriage of IL / 587 N.E.2d 577 breach of contract no contract found
Bennett / contract to (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)
raise child Jewish
Boylan v. Boylan / PA / 577 A.2d 218 considers but religious stability
religious training (Pa. Super. Ct. neutrally
1990)
TABLE VIII
RELEVANT ISSUES / MODIFICATIONS
Case / Religious State / Citation Standards Used Miscellaneous
Issue Notes
Johns v. Johns / AR / 918 S.W.2d moral values, may father required to
religious training 728 (Ark. Ct. App. adversely affect / take children to
1996) custodian controls / church for "moral"
can restrict training
noncustodian
Kammerer v. WI / No. 95-0665, religion as one
Martin / relocation, 1995 WL 723249 factor / both parents
mother is member (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. can teach religion
of minority religion 7, 1995)
1670
